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MUTATING MARKS: REFUSING TO LOSE THE
TRADEMARK TRAIL
Robert W. Emerson∗ & Katharine C. Collins∗∗
ABSTRACT—This article examines and synthesizes several criticisms
underlying the expansion of trademark rights, and the sometimes irrational
results thereof. The abandonment of trademark law’s foundations, in
particular categories of marks, is illustrated most saliently where marks have
been allowed to encapsulate meaning and value in and of themselves,
unattributable to any qualities or connections to product or source. This
touches on, and bridges the gap, between areas which have received
academic attention for their problematic evolutions, including naked
licensing, strike suits, cultural and particularly sports-centric marks, and
sensory marks. Trademark doctrines such as the consumer perception for
confusion, and the spectrum of distinction, used to grant and organize marks,
are discussed. This allows us to consider how to reinvigorate commitment to
essential trademark jurisprudence.
The first Section reviews a few fundamental concepts underlying and
organizing the trademark system, in order to explain where its boundaries
belong. Sections II and III detail different considerations that emerged in step
with the expansion of a trademark’s purpose far beyond that of a source
signifier. They address matters, such as inherent goodwill, that have been
largely ignored to the detriment of the public interest, and others, such as
functionality, that have not been applied to their full, logical extent.
Section IV discusses the influence mark holders have had in shaping
this progression—one of lowering requirements and escalating powers—and
it considers the unreasonable consequences thereof. Finally, Section V
indicates how courts and regulatory agencies may bring a significant portion
of the trademarks, which have gone awry, back into the fold. Estoppel and a
reconstituting of stronger evidentiary standards can help to ensure powerful
mark holders seeking legal support for their market dominance actually meet
high burdens to do so. The current trademark law framework leaves too
much power in some mark holders’ hands, but it contains the seeds for
innovative parties and lawyers to create more sensible trademark policies.
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I.

TRADEMARK BACKGROUND

Trademarks have a long past, rooted in product association with makers
and owners, as—for example—ancient artists signed their pottery and early
ranchers wielded their cattle prods.1 The law of trademarks naturally aligns
with business, and one could argue that marketing (specifically, branding)
and trademarks are inseparable.
A. Justifications
The trademark’s purpose always has been to indicate the origin or
source of commercial goods.2 Protection in American law is based upon a

1

Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 222, 222–
24 (1983); see TONY MARTINO, TRADEMARK DILUTION 18–22 (1996) (discussing the origins of
proprietary marks in practice and law from ancient times through the Middle Ages).
2
Diamond, supra note 1, at 222.
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trademark’s informative value to consumers.3 Previously, such marks
represented a consistent source of goods, expressed the quality conveyed to
consumers, and protected consumers from being misled. As the implied
“expressive content” that these marks contained grew, theories justifying
their existence expanded to include the marks’ ability to reduce consumers’
search costs with their symbolic information. This greater economic
efficiency meets two worthy objectives of legislation by benefiting both
consumers and the free market as a whole.4
Businesses were also empowered by mark rights, which served as
useful tools allowing them both to build reputations and to expand through
the mark’s growing influence. As a consequence, advantages also accrued to
the market, as better-informed consumers could more easily recognize highquality producers. However, much of trademark expansion has been driven
by the incorrect notion that trademark rights are intended to serve the
producer’s interest, disembodied from concerns of the consumer and thus of
society and markets overall.5 Especially as businesses are, overwhelmingly,
the main participants in doctrine-shaping activity, their interests frequently
have come to overshadow the basic goals of trademark law.6
B. Uniqueness among Intellectual Property
The original purpose of trademarks is unique among the three major
domains of intellectual property: trademark, copyright, and patent law.
Those domains have been justified by incentivizing a social benefit. Patented
inventions and copyrighted expressions of creative work are thought to
enrich society prima facie. Granting limited, exclusive rights to inventors
and creators offers the possibility of profit, which encourages contributions
to society.7 Trademark value does not stand alone in this way. However, only
the informational link implied by the mark is meant to be protected by law.
In this context, it is unsurprising that trademarks are the only form of
intellectual property granted an unlimited lifespan of protection. There is no
inherent value being kept from the rest of society since these marks are
3

Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57
YALE L.J. 1165, 1184–87 (1948), reprinted in 108 YALE L.J. 1619 (1999).
4
William P. Kratzke, Normative Economic Analysis of Trademark Law, 21 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV.
199, 206-07 (1991).
5
Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687,
1705–10 (1999).
6
See Brown, supra note 3, at 1167 (“[W]hat appear to be private disputes among hucksters almost
invariably touch the public welfare. We shall therefore be concerned to ask, when courts protect trade
symbols, whether their decisions further public as well as private goals.”).
7
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WIPO PUB. NO. 450(E), WHAT IS
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY? 3 (2004), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/450/wipo_pub_
450.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2018) [hereinafter WIPO].
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simply transmitting source information.8 For copyright and patent law,
ownership is finite and put to rest after fair compensation, which allows work
to subsequently enter the public domain, for free use by all.9
This difference of purpose also leads to other distinguishing features of
trademark law among intellectual property. In the Trade-Mark Cases,
referring to copyright standards, the Supreme Court ruled that “originality is
required.”10 Even more bluntly, the patent statute11 states that nonobviousness is a pre-requisite for protection. However, trademarks lack a
similar condition of originality. An idea–expression dichotomy also defines
forms of intellectual property except trademark.12 Copyright law stipulates
protections as limited to a fixed expression of the creative work, and patents
take the form of precisely detailed instructions for making and using the
physical invention. No intellectual property rights are granted to an idea
alone. Though trademark applications require a mark’s physical nature to be
fully described, from design and placement, there is a lack of verbatim
restrictions to a singular form of the mark. Indeed, “standard character”
marks may encompass ownership of a word or phrase “without claim to any
particular font style, size, or color.”13
These distinctions from the other breeds of intellectual property all stem
from trademark’s nature as a conduit of information rather than a creation
itself. However, as marks have largely become treated as valuable objects
themselves,14 the lack of borders for these protected expressions has allowed
trademarks to escape the bounds of their legal justification.
C. Spectrum of Distinctiveness
In granting trademarks, a spectrum of distinctiveness is applied.15 This
determination is to be made in specific context of the goods at hand.16 At the
top of the spectrum, and thus immediately registrable, are fanciful marks,

8

For an argument on such a public interest given the modern relationship between trademarks and
the public, see Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108
YALE L.J. 1717 (1999).
9
WIPO, supra note 7, at 5–6.
10
In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
11
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2011).
12
Abraham Drassinower, A Rights-Based View on the Idea/Expressions Dichotomy in Copyright
Law, 16 CANADIAN J. L. & JURIS. 3, 4 (2003).
13
37 C.F.R. § 2.52(a) (2016).
14
Justin Hughes, Cognitive and Aesthetic Functionality in Trademark Law, 36 CARDOZO L. REV.
1227, 1256 (2014).
15
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) (defining the
categories of distinctiveness).
16
Remington Prods., Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Corp., 892 F.2d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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original words or symbols, such as “Kodak.”17 The next “inherently
distinctive” and thus immediately registrable marks are arbitrary, where
consideration of the context of use applies.18 These are “a known word used
in an unexpected or uncommon way” according to the Supreme Court.19 A
common trait of an arbitrary mark, such as Apple Computer,20 is that it
essentially creates a new homophone.
Finally, the last inherently distinctive class is the suggestive mark.
Suggestive marks are not immediately descriptive of the product, but are at
least a small mental leap beyond obviousness. There are other linguistic
details that may negate registration, such as “the best beer in America” being
held too broadly laudatory to effectively distinguish the product.21 A fine, but
critical, line lies at the determination between suggestive and the noninherently distinctive, merely descriptive marks.22 Trademark law has been
clear—marks should not be a tool to silence competition in the marketplace.23
Adjectives plainly describing a good’s nature must be available to all
competitors to inform consumers about goods. Thus, descriptive marks are
not registrable without proof of “acquired distinctiveness” in the public’s
mind.24
Outside this spectrum are generic terms25 which are never registrable.26
The test of genericism is if the relevant purchasing public understands the
word as the “genus” of a type of goods, as opposed to referring to a good

17

Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 943 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 943 n.6.
19
Nautilus Grp., Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 372 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing
Interstellar Starship, 304 F.3d at 943 n.6).
20
See Apple Trademark List, APPLE (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.apple.com/legal/intellectualproperty/trademark/appletmlist.html [https://perma.cc/AB8A-SC5E].
21
Boston Beer Co. Ltd. P’ship, 198 F.3d 1370, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
22
Nautilus Grp., Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 372 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
23
In fact, beyond the competitive values to be upheld by barring purely descriptive terms, in other
commentary or cases outside the scope of this article, the use of trademark in creating an extremely strong,
almost generic, brand name may be considered a factor in evaluating whether there is an unfair,
monopolistic business practices. See Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics
Approach, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 57, 68 (Spr. 2005).
24
15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2015); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1212 (2017) (hereinafter, “T.M.E.P.”), available at http://www.uspto.gov
/trademark/guides-and-manuals/tmep-archives [https://perma.cc/B6M6-38Q2] (acquired distinctiveness
or secondary meaning).
25
See Vanessa Bowman Pierce, If It Walks Like a Duck and Quacks Like a Duck, Shouldn’t It Be a
Duck?: How a “Functional” Approach Ameliorates the Discontinuity Between the “Primary
Significance” Tests for Genericness and Secondary Meaning, 37 N.M. L. REV. 147, 185 (2007) (arguing
for integration of primary significance determination with genus determination for a more functional
perspective).
26
Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 943 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002).
18
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coming from a single source.27 In establishing the public’s conception of the
word’s primary significance,28 one can use a variety of sources, including
dictionary definitions,29 publications, and online search results. If the term is
commonly used to refer to a class of products beyond the mark holder’s good
or service, the term may be generic. Even for registered marks, “genericide”30
is a looming possibility, compelling mark holders to protect their marks by
stopping third parties from misusing it.31 Even a formerly distinctive mark
may become mentally reclassified to represent a whole genus of goods,
which puts the mark in peril of cancellation. This is why mark holders, to
prevent meaning of a term from being altered, pursue perceived infringers.
Even non-interested parties, including the media, are often reprimanded for
“misuse” of a trademark that erodes its meaning, and holders themselves
should be wary of destroying their rights by using their marks meaninglessly.
II. GOODWILL
Goodwill has played a prominent role in the expansion of modern
trademark law.32 However, the concept has only acknowledged in a rather
lopsided way, ignored and thus effectively stymied where unattributable to
mark holders. Goodwill is “loyalty that a business earns from its
customers.”33 Reputation-related advantage, the tendency of consumers to
make repurchases,34 and other hard-to-quantify definitions are all used in an
effort to characterize goodwill. Goodwill is accounted for in financial
statements at staggering amounts by some businesses,35 so it is certainly a
27

H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
In re Murphy Door Bed Co., 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1030, 1033 (T.T.A.B. 1984) (“[T]he test of
whether or not a word has a generic connotation is the primary significance that term has to the purchasing
public.”).
29
See In re Murphy Door Bed Co., 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1031–32 (stating dictionaries “are
credible evidence going to the perception of the term by the public”).
30
See Pierce, supra note 25.
31
See Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
585, 589 (2008).
32
See Apostolos Chronopoulos, Goodwill Appropriation as a Distinct Theory of Trademark
Liability: A Study on the Misappropriation Rationale in Trademark and Unfair Competition Law, 22 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J., 253 (2013).
33
Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Goodwill: Take a Sad Song and Make It Better, 46 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 349, 352 (2013) (citing court opinions and legal and business texts). For a more elaborate
articulation, see Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark
Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547 (2005).
34
Id. at 583.
35
See generally Financial reporting developments: Intangibles—Goodwill and other, ERNST &
YOUNG
(2009),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/FinancialReportingDevelopments_
BB1499_GoodwillIntangible_November_2009/$FILE/FinancialReportingDevelopments_BB1499_Goo
dwillIntangible_November%202009.pdf (analyzing accounting standards for measuring goodwill on a
company balance sheet). [https://perma.cc/YEM6-H5GG].
28
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monetary reality. In modern consumer research—both as an accounting
concept and as a market reality—it is recognized that goodwill is of the
utmost importance to protect, and it is often embodied by the trademarks a
business owns.36
A. Changing Nature
While trademarks and implied goodwill were initially confined to a
specific product only, trouble arose from misleading associative links. Aunt
Jemima’s pancake mix became popular around 1900; by 1922 the name and
jolly image had been co-opted by other companies to sell highly similar
products from flour to syrup. The judiciary set precedent by expanding Aunt
Jemima’s trademark rights to protect brand goodwill beyond pancake mix to
reach these closely related product categories.37 The reasoning for this
expansion, that these offerings were similar enough that consumers may be
confused as to the source, or rely on Aunt Jemima’s reputation in their
decision-making, is convincing. It was also recognized that the owners of
Aunt Jemima might be interested in branching out and taking their reputation
with them into other product categories where they already had specialized
interest and experience.
Expansion of goodwill’s power has come with the reciprocal rise of
licensing trademarks.38 These agreements allow a third party to utilize the
mark in question, originally for identical products where the consumer’s
concern likely is not the product’s literal source but its adherence to uniform
quality standards; these other producers are, of course, not free to
misrepresent that they are the originating source itself, but in theory
producers must uphold the quality standards a mark represents. Where
licensing departs from the intended information transmission function is
where it becomes “naked.” Naked licensing is licensing of a mark without
any quality control over the associated products, by the trademark owner. If
owners do not ensure anything about a product bearing their marks, the
marks are essentially meaningless and are not serving an objective rooted in
trademark’s source-designating or consumer-protecting justifications.39
36

Posner, supra note 23. For criticism of how this priority arose, see Lemley, supra note 5.
Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 409–10 (2d Cir. 1917).
38
See Irene Calboli, The Case for a Limited Protection of Trademark Merchandising, 2011 U. ILL.
L. REV. 865, 879 (2011).
39
Rudolph J. Kuss, The Naked Licensing Doctrine Exposed: How the Courts Interpret the Lanham
Act to Require Licensors to Police Their Licensees & Why this Requirement Conflicts with Modern
Licensing Realities and the Goals of Trademark Law, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV 361, 365 (2005).
Recently, this rather remote trademark restriction gained press coverage when Belgian-owned Budweiser
temporarily “renamed” its flagship beer “America,” for the summer of 2016. Company representatives
outright acknowledge this as a means to capitalize on patriotic contemporary events, from an Olympic
37
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Merchandising flipped the dynamics of licensing by utilizing the
goodwill embodied in a mark to sell unrelated and promotional goods.
Goodwill began to be treated as a property in its own right, as opposed to a
nebulous idea.40 The intent of protecting consumers from being misled by
goodwill misappropriation took a backseat as goodwill’s power was
recognized. This transformed into a “right”41 to profit off of goodwill, which
has since been conflated as a wholesale justification of trademarks’
existence. In advancing goodwill-protection as a rationale for trademarks, it
is often argued that the markholder invested in the mark, creating the
goodwill it expresses, and that others shall not “reap what they have not
sown.” This belies the distinguishing feature of trademark from other
intellectual property—that no act of creativity is accounted for in the balance
of trademark protection.
B. Inherent Goodwill
Circumstances exist where the intrinsic value of a mark predates its use
as one, where nothing is being “sown” at all, or at least it is unclear to whom
such “sowing” should be attributed. Minor statutory restrictions can be seen
to reflect acknowledgement of this concept of “inherent goodwill,” or the
value that marks might convey apart from a designation of any source. For
instance, there is a prohibition on a mark which “consists of or comprises the
flag or coat of arms or other insignia of the United States, or of any State or
municipality, or of any foreign nation, or any simulation thereof.”42 While
this may serve to avoid incorrect source-designation, in effect, it also ropes
off official public icons from private use or control. This intuitively makes

games to a presidential election. While the packaging replaced its trademark with the word, no attempt
was made to file for trademark protection. See Jessica Roy, There’s no law against Budweiser calling its
beer ‘America,’ L. A. TIMES (May 10, 2016, 7:59 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-budweiseramerica-trademark-20160510-snap-htmlstory.html [http://perma.cc/3ZTA-TZPC].
40
See Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark
Law, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 105 (2005). The mark holder’s goodwill interests are often a paramount concern
of courts ruling against trademark infringers. In Facebook, Inc. v. Teachbook.com LLC, 819 F.Supp.2d
764 (N.D. Ill. 2011), the court upheld an infringement claim due to the defendant’s misleading domain
name: “one can imagine teachers searching the Internet for www.facebook.com and hitting upon
www.teachbook.com. And even though these same teachers might also read Teachbook’s attempt to
define itself as an alternative to Facebook, the initial interest stems from the goodwill associated with
Facebook, not Teachbook.” Id. at 783 (emphasis added).
41
See Charles W. Grimes & Gregory J. Battersby, The Protection of Merchandising Properties, 69
TRADEMARK REP. 431, 432 (1979). To use the Facebook, Inc. v. Teachbook.com, LLC case (supra note
40) as an example, the focus would then be more Facebook’s property interest than consumers’ protection
from misinformation.
42
15 U.S.C. § 1052(b); see also In re William Connors Paint Mfg. Co., 27 App. D.C. 389 (1906);
LA. STAT. ANN. § 33:21 (2015) (regarding the official seal, insignia, symbol, emblem, coat of arms, or
logo).
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sense for public imagery, but also begs the question where the limits of this
respect are drawn. Native Americans are granted a detailed system of
trademark restrictions to protect their cultural representations and totems.43
This is certainly not to say that such a system has been foolproof or effective;
issues of the commercialization of meaningful terms into brands, such as
Jeep Cherokee, Mohawk Paper Company, and Crazy Horse Malt Liquor,
have been raised.44 However, this statute reflects cultural protection, which
is broader than the official seals of a nation, though theoretical boundaries
are unarticulated.
The way some marks are now commercialized requires consideration
for this fundamental concept: inherent goodwill.45 Some marks carry with
them pre-existing value. If courts are to accept goodwill protection-function
as a freestanding justification for trademark law, and people should not “reap
what they have not sown,”46 then who is the rightful beneficiary when none
have demonstrable proof of value “sown?” The recognition of levels of
distinction in granting marks implicitly acknowledge that, in language, “no
term is an island,” because it must be considered in light of the particular
product and audience, and because meanings are not monolithic. Assuming
secondary meaning for fanciful marks is practical as they lack preestablished linguistic tethers. Suggestive marks47 capitalize on pre-existing
meanings of the word(s) in question, with an often minute but meaningful
distinction rising above plain descriptiveness. For the descriptive marks
already obviously tied to their subject matter, requiring proof of secondary
meaning is a sound constraint on the power of trademark law. In light of the
reality of modern commerce areas where trademark law would benefit
greatly from a more contextual and functional consideration of predominant
mark meanings that might be equally strong as a dictionary definition,
especially for relevant consumers.48
43

Brian Zark, Use of Native American Tribal Names as Marks, 3 AM. INDIAN L.J. 537, 538–43
(2015).
44
WHAT’S IN A NAME? CAN NATIVE AMERICANS CONTROL OUTSIDERS’ USE OF THEIR
TRIBAL NAMES?, CULTURAL SURVIVAL (September 1994), https://www.culturalsurvival.org/
publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/whats-name-can-native-americans-control-outsiders-use
[https://perma.cc/D3GU-C79Q].
45
See Bone, supra note 33, at 598 (“Inherent goodwill includes the public meanings associated with
the mark itself, independent of the product to which it is connected and independent of any particular
brand or firm.”).
46
See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericicity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 404 (1990) (discussing trademark law’s adoption of the “reap
where one has not sown” concept for consumers claiming ownership of value in the marks).
47
As delineated by the spectrum of distinctiveness, supra I. C. Spectrum of Distinctiveness.
48
For a thoughtful look at how to interpret an audience’s interpretation of a mark, see Laura A.
Heymann, The Reasonable Person in Trademark Law, WILLIAM & MARY LAW SCHOOL SCHOLARSHIP
REPOSITORY (2008), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/194.
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C. Idioms and Atmospherics
Trademarks may come pre-loaded with a wealth of associations in the
public’s mind. This is clear from the recognition that certain non-descriptive
terms are “arbitrary” in relation to a particular subject, while others are more
closely related and thus “suggestive.” However, there are many examples in
which accurately perceiving a term’s well-established connotation or
perhaps even its actual definition requires substantial consideration of the
cultural context in which it exists.
An idiom, summarized from definitions given by Merriam Webster, is
a grammatically peculiar expression, characteristic to the type of art, person,
class, community, or area, with a separate meaning of its own, not contained
in the separate words.49 One that attracted national attention in the context of
trademarks is “who dat.” First usage of this phrase dates back to late 1800s
minstrel shows and poems, sticking around for the turn of the century to
appear alongside jazz culture and, reflexively, blackface.50 It was said to be
a responsive catchphrase for World War II fighter pilots51 before turning to
a sports cheer52 at historically African-American high schools and colleges
around Louisiana. In line with its musical origins, the phrase’s first
documented association with the New Orleans Saints (a team in the National
Football League (NFL)) came in 1983, when a New Orleans singer blended
it alongside “When the Saints Go Marching In” in a video with the NFL
players.53 The term continues to bloom in African-American music—sans
sports references. Among many others, it was rapped by a native of New
Orleans, Lil Wayne, in his song, “A Milli” in 2008.54
49

Idiom,
MERRIAM
WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/idiom
[https://perma.cc/NG87-GB43].
50
Dave Walker, ‘Who Dat?’ Popularized by New Orleans Saints Fans When ‘Everybody was
Looking for the Sign, NOLA TIMES-PICAYUNE (Jan. 13, 2010, 7:16 AM), http://www.nola.com/saints
/index.ssf/2010/01/who_dat_popularized_when_every.html [http://perma.cc/JFS6-S7JK].
51
Erin Z. Bass, Who is Who Dat?, DEEP SOUTH MAGAZINE (Jan. 28, 2010),
http://deepsouthmag.com/2010/01/who-is-who-dat/ [https://perma.cc/KTD4-GUV4].
52
Amy Davidson, The Strange Case of Who Dat, NEW YORKER (Feb. 9, 2010),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/the-strange-case-of-who-dat [https://perma.cc/2YZKXSZL].
53
Dbg53, Who Dat featuring Aaron Neville & the TopCats, YOUTUBE (Dec. 20, 2009),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WfEjZunhEvY (documenting players’ excellent dancing and
acknowledging the cheer as a “unique blend of New Orleans dialect,” as well as the Saints General
Manager discussing genesis of the chant by fans) (“Every place we went last fall we’d see ‘who dat’
signs, we would hear the ‘who dat’ chant. Our players enjoyed it, and we thought ‘why not?’ And I think
this will grow into something real big.”).
54
LIL’ WAYNE, A MILLI (Cash Money Records 2008) (saying “who dat” at 2:25, unlikely in
reference to the Saints, given Wayne’s public statements of support for the Green Bay Packers NFL
football team, as opposed to the Saints, in interviews available at https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=C6mNpVzuerw).

158

15:149 (2018)

Mutating Marks: Refusing to Lose the Trademark Trail

The New Orleans Saints earned their first bid to the Super Bowl in
2010. That, in turn, led to a flurry of cease and desist letters, from the NFL
to numerous Louisiana businesses, claiming the phrase “who dat” as
exclusive property of the NFL.55 The league held those rights in Florida,
where the championship game was to be held. “If ‘who dat’ is used in a
manner to refer to Saints football, then the Saints own the rights” was the
position of NFL spokespersons, extrapolating ownership to include a fleurde-lis symbol or black and gold color scheme as well.56 The response was
loud public indignation ranging from bipartisan retorts by Louisiana public
officials57 to outcries that the NFL engaged in opportunistic cultural
profiteering,58 among many other complaints.59 These criticisms demanded
the NFL respect a concept quite similar to copyright’s “public domain,”
which in a classical sense would not be a concern of trademark law. While
originality of the mark itself is unnecessary, originality of its meaning—or
at least the lack of a pre-existing associative link—is allegedly the
foundation of a trademark holder’s right. If the relevant purchasing public
consists of New Orleans or even Louisiana residents, “who dat” is
inextricably linked to their community and culture. Beyond its constant link
to southern Louisiana geographically, the term closely follows AfricanAmerican masculinity, history, culture, and identity.60 That Louisiana
resident fans logically linked it to yet another hometown football team61

55

Associated Press, NFL Claims Trademark Infringement, ESPN (Jan. 30, 2010),
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/playoffs/2009/news/story?id=4871697 [https://perma.cc/X44K-DQPV].
(threatening production of “who dat say we can’t print who dat?” tee shirts in an open letter to NFL
commissioner Roger Goodell from Senator David Vitter).
56
Jennifer Levitz, Who Owns ‘Who Dat’? Dats Us Sez da NFL, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2010, 12:01
AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703389004575033504283711006
[https://perma.cc/2AXK-S4FC].
57
Associated Press, NFL Claims Trademark Infringement, ESPN (Jan. 30, 2010),
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/playoffs/2009/news/story?id=4871697 [https://perma.cc/X44K-DQPV].
(“Please either drop your present ridiculous position or sue me.”).
58
Jennifer Levitz, Who Owns ‘Who Dat’? Dats Us Sez da NFL, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2010, 12:01
AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703389004575033504283711006
[https://perma.cc/2AXK-S4FC] (illustrating the cultural significance of the phrase; “The NFL, they
contend, never cared about the quirky chant when the football team was dubbed the ‘Aints a few decades
ago, or after it was ousted from its home stadium in 2005 by Hurricane Katrina and finished 3-13.”).
59
Id. (providing evidence for the overwhelming roots of the phrase to locals includes a reference to
“a woman who said her dog is named ‘Who Dat’”).
60
Kathleen Flynn, Saints Call ‘Who Dat’ Black-and-Gold Casket a Trademark Violation, NOLA
TIMES-PICAYUNE,
http://www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/2014/02/nfl_says_who_dat_casket_a_
trad.html [https://perma.cc/K2FQ-GVEL] (showing that even in 2014 clashes continued, here against a
local casket builder using ‘who dat’ and related iconography, an extreme which begs the question of if
purchasers could conceivably be confused as to the NFL as a source or quality control over their final
resting place, as opposed to broader cultural messaging).
61
Davidson, supra note 52 (referring to earlier use by two local high schools).
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through music62 in the 1980s should not be interpreted as forfeiting “who
dat” to NFL commissioner Roger Goodell or anyone else’s control. The
questions raised by the “who dat” controversy remain largely unanswered
due to settlements and prohibitive court costs.63
Another historically rich example is “Derby Pie.”64 To most, bourbon,
pecans, and chocolate alongside Kentucky Derby iconography, characterize
the traditional dessert. A different recipe, sans bourbon and pecans with the
attached moniker of Kern’s Kitchen, is sold by “Derby Pie” mark holders.
Since 1968, the Derby Pie “owners” have rigorously defended it in court.65
In 1988, Bon Appetit magazine won a summary judgment motion66 on a
genericism suit by presenting magazines, cookbooks, and menus from across
the country, all containing different recipes of the pie and all independent of
Kern’s, only to have it overturned as insufficient evidence on appeal and
settled out of court.67
Ralph Lauren, an American clothing brand, offers several instances of
capitalization on pre-existing mark meaning. Associations of polo, a sport of
horseback riding and mallets, with the cultural upper crust of society dates
back to first century Persian kings68—or, alternatively, in Ralph Lauren’s
view to a distinctly American lifestyle brand in 1967.69 Polo Ralph Lauren,
a subset of the clothing company, brought a suit against Polo Magazine, a
periodical backed by the sport’s governing body the United States Polo
Association (USPA),70 when the magazine attempted to expand from a
sports-only publication to the lifestyle associated with it. Given the

62

Dbg53, supra note 53.
For more on the structural troubles of outside parties attempting to rein in marks, see infra Section
IV. A. Anti-Competitive Incentives.
64
Nina Feldman, What’s Inside a ‘Derby Pie’? Maybe a Lawsuit Waiting to Happen, NPR THE SALT
(May 1, 2015, 9:39 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2015/05/01/399842082/whats-inside-aderby-pie-maybe-a-lawsuit-waiting-to-happen [https://perma.cc/3N8N-BUSX].
65
Brett Barrouquere, Derby Pie maker, restaurant end trademark dispute, HUFFINGTON POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/10/02/a-pie-by-any-other-name-_n_4030728.html [https://perma.cc/
9BD4-NE9T] (Last updated: October 2, 2013, 12:59 PM). The Claudia Sanders Dinner House was on the
receiving end of one particular suit, based only on how diners and servers would refer to the pie, despite
official menus granting it another uncontested name. Id.
66
Kern’s Kitchen, Inc. v. Bon Appetit, 669 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Ky. 1987) (providing evidence of
generic uses including “some 20 restaurants, stores and shops in 8 states” as well as “132 cookbooks, 23
newspapers and 10 magazine articles”).
67
Kern’s Kitchen, Inc. v. Bon Appetit, 850 F.2d 692 (6th Cir. 1988) (indicating that a lack of
consumer surveys is “not necessarily fatal to defendant’s argument at trial” but rules it insufficient to rely
on “anecdotal” evidence).
68
See Richard C. Latham, Polo, BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/sports/polo
[https://perma.cc/2Y99-T79L].
69
Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000).
70
Id.
63
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prominence of Polo Ralph Lauren and connotations of high-class athletics it
had adopted, courts found the magazine’s expansion created a risk of
confusing the public. The court also addressed the case’s irony: “PRL [Polo
Ralph Lauren] products became famous by basking in the reflected glow of
an elegant sport. PRL now asserts that it, not the sport, is the source of the
glow. . . . In a sense, PRL is biting the hand that fed it.”71 However, the court
treated the magazine as a combination of artistic and commercial expression,
and remanded the case to establish less burdensome relief, such as
disclaimers, to prevent possible confusion.72 Purely commercial speech from
the same source, though, may have been silenced.
Ralph Lauren did not confine its glow-basking to one sport. Rugby rose
to popularity in 1850s Britain or, in mark form, from a 2004 Ralph Lauren
brand extension. Here, not only were the atmospheric connotations of the
sport seized, but so too was the term itself.73 The use of “rugby” by anyone
other than Ralph Lauren when printed on clothing, or even alongside other
words, was met with cease-and-desist letters from PRL. Again, a suit was
filed against organizers of the actual sport being described, a body called
Rugby America. Unlike the Polo suit, Rugby had never intruded into the
“lifestyle” commerce Ralph Lauren often stakes—it simply used the word in
its description of the Rugby America organization printed on clothing.
Rugby America succeeded, but only by a legal technicality which persuaded
Ralph Lauren to back down.74 In the Polo trial, USPA lawyers attempted to
establish Ralph Lauren’s pattern of claiming a very broad scope of marks by
noting the company’s disregard for the sport of rugby before the second suit
was even filed.75 While groups from both sports ultimately retained
reasonable ability to use the words, neither result set a precedent for
protecting the logical mark users from this type of costly legal action. In
addition to the structural impediments to preventing a privatization of these

71

Id. at 673.
Id. at 675 (noting, “The appropriate remedy may be may be ‘not less speech, but more.’”).
73
Alex Goff, Perseverance Sees Rugby Company Win Legal Battle with Polo Ralph Lauren, RUGBY
TODAY (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.rugbytoday.com/rugby-news-around-america/perseverance-seesrugby-company-win-legal-battle-polo-ralph-lauren [https://perma.cc/69GK-CU35].
74
Id. (filing a countersuit for fraudulent PTO filings by Ralph Lauren for products Ralph Lauren
lacked intent to produce is what Rugby America representatives claim led to the suit being dropped with
prejudice).
75
U.S. Polo Ass’n, Inc. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). An odd
parallel stands out when comparing the fact that Ralph Lauren had a chain of stores named “Rugby,” with
Lauren having no significant ties to or even apparent interest in the sport, Rugby, while he long had a
beloved dog with that very name, Rugby. Compare this to another dog name “Who Dat,” which was taken
as evidence of public interest in a mark. See Levitz, supra note 58. In contrast, Lauren’s naming of his
dog could be evidence that the term’s public connotations were meaningless to Lauren. Buzz McClain,
Ralph Lauren vs Rugby?, RUGBY MAGAZINE (Apr. 15, 2006).
72
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culturally-created mark-meanings, the aforementioned examples also
illustrate the problem of attribution of such value.
D. Free Riders
As protection of a producer’s goodwill has been elevated to a primary
justification for trademark rights, producers have been allowed to expand
their spheres of control. When mark holders balk that infringers “reap what
they have not sown,”76 they are asserting exclusive ownership of whatever
value there is to be reaped. In dilution cases, the mark holder’s investment
in a mark is quantified using metrics such as advertising spending.77
With the rise of “intent to use” applications, mark holders can begin to
stake their claims without evidence of any actual use,78 much less evidence
that the mark’s appeal to consumers should be contributed to the registrant.
If common interpretations of the mark’s meaning are to be considered at all
beyond assessing distinctiveness, pre-existing appeal is assumed to
evaporate the moment the mark is registered. The impressions a mark gives
to what the law would deem a typical consumer are distilled from a
compilation of assumptions, almost all of which are put forth by parties
vested in commercial potential.79 This is well-expressed by Graeme W.
Austin:
There is of course an important normative preference for one set of consumers
over others that is close to the surface of these neutrally-expressed
“presumptions.” As a result, the ordinarily prudent consumer gets constructed
as somebody who is concerned with whether goods are officially sponsored,
and not as somebody who values the brand for its affiliative symbolism alone.
It is not prudent, apparently, for consumers to want promotional goods simply
for their own sake, and possibly to pay cheaper prices, with little concern with
the actual origin of the goods.80

76
77

See Dreyfuss, supra note 46.
See Nat’l. Pork Bd. v. Supreme Lobster & Seafood Co., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1479, (T.T.A.B.

2010).
78

Frank Z. Hellwig, The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988: The 100th Congress Leaves Its Mark,
79 TRADEMARK REP. 287, 291–292 (1989). The statute only requires a bona fide intent to use the mark,
not actual proof of use. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1128 (1988).
79
Challenges and criticism of the inconsistencies in and inadequate methodology of measuring
consumer sentiment are included infra, Sections III. B. Of the Consumer, and IV. C. Creation of
Commercial Association. Almost without exception, tests lack a “negative” approach that would attempt
to measure consumer sentiment which could lead to an outcome without financial beneficiaries. This
follows logically from the costly nature of consumer research, and the incentives and lack thereof in the
current trademark system.
80
Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 901
(2004).
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There are many conceivable interests of the consumer that have been
left behind in trademark law. Self-expression, either freedom to use
trademarks as cultural artifacts81 or in preserving existing cultural artifacts
from being converted into marks,82 are two such valuable interests when
considering marks with pre-existing value.
A deeper problem emerges when skewed value-attribution is overlaid
with the loosening of requirements to register a trademark. The allowance of
intent to use in mark registrations, by the Trademark Law Revision Act of
1988,83 created mark approval without any proof of any investment, requiring
only a sworn statement of the applicant’s intent to use and good faith, which
goes unscrutinized. This establishes a date of mark ownership if proof of
commercial use is provided within a timeframe of up to 36 months. Once
this is granted, a high assumption of mark validity is given. Removing the
need to prove commercial use without commensurately reducing the
assumptive power of the mark’s registration has thrown the trademark
system off-balance.84
Certainly intellectual property free-riding extends beyond the
trademark domain. A window for opportunistic85 behavior is not isolated to
trademark law; “patent trolls” abusing ambiguous bad-faith patents have
become a newsworthy subject rampant in the technology sector and which
have been investigated by Congress.86 Domain squatting, or “cyber-piracy,”87
has been defeated by famed businesses in court.88 Similarly, “celebrity
squatting” often delves into remedies through a right to publicity,89 but
illustrates this issue of culture and technology blurring the standards for
attribution. One does not have to be invoking a name to infringe on rights to
publicity, with the seminal case protecting a celebrity’s rights through a

81

See Dreyfuss, supra note 46.
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural
Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L. J. 1533, 1569 (1993).
83
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1128 (1988); Hellwig, supra note 78, at 291–292.
84
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §19.08[1][a] (3d ed. 1995);
United States Trademark Association, Trademark Review Commission, Report and Recommendation to
USTA Present and Board Members, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 392–393 (1987).
85
Lee B. Burgunder, Opportunistic Trademarking of Slogans: It’s No Clown Issue, Bro, 31
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 769 (2013).
86
Econostats at George Mason University, Who Are Patent Trolls and What Will We Do about
Them?, FORBES (May 29, 2015, 4:20 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/econostats/2015/05/29/who-arepatent-trolls-and-what-will-h-r-9-do-about-them/ [https://perma.cc/92AL-RP8Q].
87
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
88
Nike, Inc. v. Circle Group Internet, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 688 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
89
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
82
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prominent catchphrase,90 and Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB)
precedent coming to respect commercial linkage91 as well as the mark’s
being “almost a nickname.”92
Even modern “fame” does not easily lead to clear attributions of
investment in creating mark value. As technology and mass media have
borne the concept of ‘going viral’ almost instantaneously, it becomes harder
to trace the rise of a mark’s notoriety. One jarring example is the case of
“Let’s roll,”93 a colloquialism that became imbued with new communal and
individual meanings within hours of being uttered by a passenger on a
crashing plane during the September 11th attacks. The term rapidly gained a
massive well-known set of associations attached to it. Though it became
endowed with powerful meaning, this was clearly not the sort of
informational function trademark law intended to protect, as no producer
reputation was conveyed though circumstances established intrinsic
goodwill.94 There are no advertising expenditures any particular party can
point to as its investment in creating the mark. Nevertheless, an unrelated
individual was able to take ownership over the phrase through trademark,
without any questions asked.95
Another historic event, the Brexit (British exit) from the European
Union (EU), has been the subject of trademark petitions. The makers of
Samuel Adams Boston Lager filed an application to trademark the term with
intent to use for hard cider on June 24, 2016, the day of the referendum’s
announced results favoring the United Kingdom’s leaving the EU.96 The proBrexit vote was so momentous that it resulted in British Prime Minister
David Cameron’s resignation and in the British pound’s value dropping to a
three-decade low for that national currency. Google Trends show that in
comparison to searches that day for the term “Brexit,” searches for this

90

See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (showing how at
this point in trademark law, it was important that this phrase included Johnny’s name, had a two-decade
consistency in the public eye, and was repeated nightly on broadcast television).
91
Robert D. Litowitz & Mark Traphagen, The Song Remains the Same, 18 TEX. PARALEGAL J.
(2000), https://txpd.org/tpj/18/song_same.htm [https://perma.cc/396A-ZKM3].
92
Id. (“affidavits of several members of the music industry stating that ‘Margaritaville’ was almost
a nickname of Jimmy Buffet”).
93
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76316210 (filed Sept. 22, 2001); See also Noah Bleicher,
Trademarking Tragedy: The Fight for Exclusive Rights to ‘Let’s Roll’, 52 EMORY L.J. 1847 (2003).
94
Bleicher, supra note 93, at 1865.
95
Bleicher, supra note 93, at 1874–75.
96
Jacob Gershman, Sam Adams Brewer Seeks to Trademark ‘Brexit,’ WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2016
11:55
AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/06/29/sam-adams-brewer-seeks-to-trademark-brexit/
[https://perma.cc/PZ6P-EP4W].
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brewer, and even “beer” itself, occurred with frequencies of zero and four
percent, respectively.97
Under these circumstances, it seems that mark holders are the ones “free
riding” or “reaping where they have not sown.” If efforts are to be made to
better articulate the value a mark does (or does not) contain in commerce,
then its primary functions must be examined in several dimensions.
III. PRIMARY PURPOSE
In the light of protecting information transmission and consumer
interests,98 understanding the potentially multidimensional purposes of a
mark is critical. The reality that a mark interacts with and affects the product
at hand, and the normative choice to deny mark-based non-reputational
advantages to one competitor, are reflected by the doctrine of functionality,
including aesthetic functionality. Marks may be valuable for their own
communicative strength. Some desirable non-source messages—including,
without any controversy, plain product-description and the extension thereto
to personal expression by consumers—are not meant for commoditization
via trademark. Investigating the perception of consumers at the point of
purchase, as well as the primary appeal or use the product serves for them,
facilitates the most realistic grasp on a possible mark’s nature.
A. Of the Mark
The functionality doctrine restricts trademarks on aspects of the product
which are “essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost
or quality of the article.”99 This delineates the boundary from patent law,
which is meant to reward functional advances and inventions. It also protects
meaningful competition for the benefit of the market. Features have been
defined as functional if restricting them would cause “significant, nonreputational disadvantages” to competitors.100 Essential product functions
may be classified in a variety of ways; thus, we will borrow from literature
segmenting functions of utile, aesthetic, and commutative purposes. 101

97

GOOGLE
TRENDS,
https://www.google.com/trends/explore#q=brexit%2C%20%2Fm%
2F05hm41r%2C%20%2Fm%2F01599&date=today%201-m&cmpt=q&tz=Etc%2FGMT%2B4
(last
visited Feb. 4, 2018) [https://perma.cc/VBP6-QNGW].
98
See supra Section I. A. Justifications.
99
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850–51 n.10 (1982).
100
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995).
101
Vincent N. Palladino, Trade Dress Functionality After TrafFix: The Lower Courts Divide Again,
93 TRADEMARK REP. 1219, 1224–25 (2003).
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Utile functions are features directly contributing to the product purpose
as intended by the producer.102 However, intended function is not necessarily
espoused in good faith on all trademark registrations. This can be illustrated
by the controversy surrounding Boise State University’s trademark on its
abnormal blue-turf football field.103 Its trademark registration details an
entertainment purpose, through intercollegiate sports played in the stadium
and shown through media.104 First, it could and has been argued that a
colorful field qualitatively affects those purposes. Telegenic benefits are
touted by owners of similarly vibrant sports fields105 and are a prized factor
for media broadcasters.106 Complaints of competitive advantage in those
intercollegiate sports, by way of camouflage, emerged when Boise’s football
team adopted turf-matching blue uniforms.107 The scientific merits of this
asserted advantage has not been studied, but complaints appear to be
bolstered by the football team’s uncharacteristically strong home win record
correlating with the use of such uniforms.108 Additionally, any sourceidentifying purpose is dubious in context. The turf is physically fixed within
the campus grounds, surrounded by Boise State signage, and during game
broadcasts, students and fans.109 In broadcasts, primarily of college football
games, the scoreboard, uniforms, traditional field markings, and presentation
by announcers all clearly identify the host team.110 These potential
advantages for Boise State, even only in its stated purposes of sporting events
and of securing lucrative broadcasts, outweigh whatever incremental,
source-identifying objective is available.

102

TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
For a comprehensive examination, see Michelle Gallagher, Who Owns Blue? An Examination of
the Functionality Doctrine in University Sports Color, 104 TRADEMARK REP. 765 (2014).
104
BLUE TURF, Registration No. 3,707,623.
105
Clare Lochary, For Field Hockey, a New, Blue View, N.Y. TIMES (Jul 6, 2012, 8:48 AM),
http://london2012.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/06/for-field-hockey-a-new-blue-view/
[https://perma.cc/9UFB-KFFY].
106
Sportvision, Inc. v. Sportsmedia Tech. Corp., WL 408634, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal Feb. 17, 2006).
107
See Gallagher, supra note 103.
108
Boise State’s home record from 1980 until field implementation was 28-10 (73.7%) with an away
record of 19-13 (59.4%). The colored field was implemented at the beginning of the 1986 season, when
Boise State went 4-2 at home and 1-5 away. From the field’s implementation through October 24, 2015
Boise State went 166-33 (83.4%) at home and 104-75 (58%) away. Since the 1999 season, the team has
only lost 4 out of 104 home games, the best home field record in all of college football by win percentage.
Even then, three of those losses came with Boise State wore non-blue uniforms. While traditional “home
field advantage” can explain some of the discrepancy, it is at least a remarkable pattern. Statistics from
cfbdatawarehouse.com.
109
See Sam Fortier, Boise State Mounts a Paper Defense of Its Home Turf, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/sports/ncaafootball/boise-state-mounts-a-paper-defense-ofits-home-turf.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4ME9-J62A].
110
Id.
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Aesthetic functionality111 is described in the Pagliero case as
ornamentation serving “an important ingredient in the commercial success.”
112
The court determined that consumers interpreted a decorative pattern on
china as a desirable quality in and of itself, and not primarily as a source
indicator: “the design sells the china.”113 There are two significant
implications of this doctrine, which established that when a design performs
a function more so than identifies a source, it should not receive protection
under trademark law. The first is a priority for consumer interests. No matter
the legitimacy of efforts undertaken by the mark holder, purchaser
perceptions are of greater concern. The second is the judiciary’s realistic
conception of this purchasing public. The perfectly rational, as in utilitarian,
consumer is a myth.114 Even if rationality were possible, to consumers,
aesthetics are a valid function, 115 and if that value is significant enough, then
it is not meant to be swept up into trademark protection. To discuss
ingredients in commercial success acknowledges a multitude of forces at
work in decision-making. Aesthetic functionality is respected when
consumer interests are evaluated realistically and comprehensively.
Communicative function is the category most often ignored and
threatened by modern trademark practices, as much legal scholarship has
discussed.116 Many “communications” touch upon the desires of consumers
versus producers, but others are purely informative statements117 that a
layman might assume belong in a “public domain.” For instance, a 32-yearold man was granted several trademarks in the mid-1990s for the standard

111

Margot E. Parmenter, Louboutins and Legal Loopholes: Aesthetic Functionality and Fashion, 40
PEPP. L. REV. 4 (2013).
112
Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952).
113
Id. at 343–44.
114
Devin R. Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, 64 FLA. L. REV. 981, 1029 (2012) (“Mired in the
world of the fully rational consumer, trademark law claims that trademarks are information resources for
the consumer to use as part of the purchasing process. Whether this rational creature exists is questionable,
and empirical work to support the view is missing.”).
115
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 170 (1995) (“[S]atisfy the noble instinct for
giving the right touch of beauty to common and necessary things.”) (quoting G. Chesterton, Simplicity
and Tolstoy 61 (1912)).
116
See, e.g., Joseph P. Lui, Sports Merchandising, Publicity Rights, and the Missing Role of the
Sports Fan, 11 B.C. L. REV. 421, 448 (2011); Stephanie Frank, Showing Your School Spirit: Why
University Color Schemes and Indicia Do Not Deserve Trademark Protection, 92 B.U. L. REV. 329, 364
(2012); Gerald T. Tschura, Likelihood of Confusion and Expressive Functionality: A Fresh Look at the
Ornamental Use of Institutional Colors, Names and Emblems on Apparel and Other Goods, 53 WAYNE
L. REV. 873, 884–87 (2007).
117
In re Volvo Cars of North America Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1455 (TTAB 1998) (rejecting “drive
safely”).
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character mark, “Class of 2000,”118 for a range of product categories from tee
shirts to teddy bears. When this story hit the news about 16 months before
that academic “class” would generally graduate, he already had over 30
licensees who had each agreed to 8 to 10 percent royalty fees to use the
term.119 Where copyright law prohibits registering non-original facts or
phrases, trademark law does not.120 Instead of carrying information about
source or even qualities associated with source, communicative marks may
themselves constitute the information itself. No consistent litmus test is
applied to determine the mark’s primary meaning or possibly protected
functions before granting functionally powerful trademark rights.
B. Of the Consumer
The consumer’s motivations in purchase decisions are also evaluated
and ranked in trademark disputes. Consumers may be simply utilitarian and
rely only on a product’s reputation, or they may be swayed by emotion and
beauty. There are many psychological needs that brands can fulfill to attract
consumers by way of trademarks.121 Goods may serve as “billboards,”
communicative tools in the hands of consumers to express themselves.122
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Associated Press, ‘Class of 2000’ Trademarked for Merchandise in Retailers, TOLEDO BLADE,
Oct. 7, 1998, https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=Yg8wAAAAIBAJ&sjid=6gMEAAAAIBAJ&
pg=3896%2C2418085 [https://perma.cc/3PPS-25PZ].
119
The judiciary, of course, is not blind or indifferent to the stark clashes of common sense with
statute. This is one such mark that would likely be struck down by any court which seriously evaluated
consumer interpretation or the content of the mark. However, a combination of “the tragedy of the
commons” and “the path of least resistance” allows marks in the style of “Class of 2000” to exist
profitably. Users who believe they have a clear legal right to these words would also simultaneously
believe that the mark holder’s legal threats would be unsuccessful, and would rationally believe this mark
is invalid. That belief can be pursued by an expensive legal case petitioning for generification, opening
up the mark to all users by the efforts and expenditures of one. Alternatively, it may be pursued simply
ignoring legal threats and continuing about one’s business, at no cost. If the mark holder truly believes in
the mark’s legitimacy, then he or she may move forward with threats and the court will rule, putting this
legitimacy at the risk of the court’s evaluation. However, as long as the mark holder does not carry through
with legal action against “infringers,” there is hardly any risk of cancellation. Merely notifying users of
the mark registration allows for the possibility of licensing payments from those who take the threat
seriously, or are risk-adverse. If a mark holder did not believe its registration’s ability to hold up in court,
this could be quite a profitable alternative to problematic litigation. In this particular case, the mark holder
was bold enough to publicize his opportunistic tactics and lack of intent to pursue them, supra note 118.
This particular mark holder’s behavior could be addressed by more robust importation estoppel, described
infra Section V. B. Eye on the Ball.
120
See the idea-expression dichotomy, supra Section I. B. Uniqueness among Intellectual Property.
121
WILLIAM J. MCEWEN, MARRIED TO THE BRAND: WHY CONSUMERS BOND WITH SOME BRANDS
FOR LIFE 32–33 (2005) (detailing five distinct ways brands may carry personal meaning: prestige,
representing personal qualities, membership, memory triggers, and self-completion).
122
For a thorough and very fun study of billboard products and slogan trademarking, see Burgunder,
supra note 85.
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Certainly, there is a limit to how much a consumer’s desire for
expressive use should be valued through protection from trademarking. Just
because there is demand for goods that give off the illustrious impression
that their possessors are, for example, wealthy and stylish enough to own an
Audi,123 does not grant the right to produce and sell disingenuous key chains.
In that case, defendants claimed car logos were the “actual benefit”
consumers desired and thus they were a functional feature. The court
disagreed, finding the benefit of the logo-indicated company’s goodwill was
the real motivator for sale.124 The desirability of displaying a well-known car
logo comes from poaching the connotations the mark holder built into it. It
is not merely the design of an Audi symbol, but the inferred luxury and
financial standing it carries because of the association to high-status cars. It
is also important to note that key chains marked with a car logo are
reasonably related product categories, where this implied association is clear.
But when the actual benefit of a mark is its implication, it does not
necessarily mean the mark holder personally created that implication. For
instance, the Jobs Daughters125 case found on appeal that a fraternal name
and emblem were functionally aesthetic and not serving as marks. The court
cited a lack of evidence that consumers would interpret the mark as sourceidentifying. Consumers were, in fact, purchasing bracelets displaying this
emblem for the symbol’s own value. If the Au-tomotive use was unacceptable
because the owner’s meaning was misappropriated by third parties for
ornamental use, there should be reciprocal consideration when pre-existing
meanings are being mined by the original mark holders. 126
There are numerous other trademark cases in relation to the insignia of
fraternal or “Greek” organizations for parallel consideration. The district
court in Pure Country127 rejected outright the Jobs Daughter’s logic
regarding aesthetic functionality, but left other logical gaps in protecting
marks used for personal expression. Charges against mark holders for
abandonment through naked licensing128 were rejected by the court “because
the consumers are the members of the trademark-holding organizations. . . .
There is no issue of consumer deceit.”129 However, there is some circular
123

Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id.
125
Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 727 F.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
126
This is arguably the case in circumstances such as those mentioned supra, D. Free Riders.
127
Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, Inc. v. Pure Country, Inc., No. IP 01-1054-C-B/F, 2004 WL
3391781 at *6 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 26, 2004).
128
See supra, Section II. A. Changing Nature.
129
Pure Country, 2004 WL 3391781 at 11. However, because the defendant here was a lapsed former
licensee, estoppel established their recognition of the mark’s owners, as well as sacrificed potential
arguments for a lack of confusion to those same buyers. Id.
124
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logic at work. Firstly, this dismisses evidence of broad, uncontrolled mark
use as irrelevant, because consumers have pre-existing relationship with the
mark. Intentional interaction with unsanctioned uses could in fact reveal that
the “relationships” are either not with or irrelevant of the trademark in its
intended sense. Instead, lapses in mark holder control are deemed harmless,
in service of an interpretation that tamps out a similar uncontrolled use for
causing harm. This is one of many illustrations of consumer competence
being determined inconsistently, at the will of mark holder interests. In
relation to the lack of source-information conveyed by a mark, one opinion
stated:
[D]efendants’ contention that UNC-CH’s marks have lost significance as
indication of origin because the public can no longer point to a single source of
the origin of goods bearing the marks does not establish abandonment, for
under Sweetheart130 abandonment occurs only when a mark loses all
significance as an indication of origin as to the mark itself.131

This is an underwhelming standard when combined with the negligible
state of “quality control” standards required to avoid a finding that a mark
has been “abandoned”.132 What instead may be protected is language and
symbolism captured by a mark, without meaningful limitations on where it
came from.
C. Of the Purchase
Aside from considering what function consumers may intend a mark to
have, it also must be analyzed according to what purpose the mark-bearing
goods themselves serve. Take, for example, the retail of licensed collegiate
apparel. There, some courts have utilized the functionality test of equallyeffective alternatives133 in establishing whether or not a university had the
exclusive right to products bearing its name:
We do not believe that anyone could seriously argue that the soft goods at issue
here are, in any realistic way, in competition with similar, unadorned soft goods.
The relevant product market for the consumer in this case is soft goods which
allow the consumer to show his or her allegiance to Pitt. . . . Because the Pitt
insignia on soft goods serve a functional purpose and largely define a sub
market [sic] of some size, granting Pitt the relief it seeks would give Pitt a
perpetual monopoly over that sub market, precluding any competition in the Pitt

130

Referencing Sweetheart Plastics, Inc. v. Detroit Forming, Inc., 743 F.2d 1039 (4th Cir. 1984).
Bd. of Gov. of Univ. of N.C. v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 173 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (emphasis
in original).
132
See infra Section IV.B.2. Diminishing Expectations of Control.
133
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32–34 (2001).
131
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insignia soft goods market. We know of no legal theory which would
countenance such a result.134

Compare that reasoning to a Texas court’s rudimentary analysis of
functionality, holding that “[t]he fact that a knit cap is scarlet and black or
bears a ‘Double T’ does not affect the quality of the cap or its ability to keep
one’s head warm.”135 As such there was “no evidence that the use of the
Texas Tech color scheme could affect the cost or quality of the products or
are the reason the products work.”136 Yet Collegiate Licensing Company
(CLC), which now represents both of these aforementioned schools in
licensing matters, itself values the collegiate merchandise retail market at
$4.6 billion.137 Just as Pitt found, it is not mere chance or a collegiate-affinity
for superior clothing and knick-knack production which creates this robust
market, with branded products that are on equal footing as any unadorned
knit cap.
The market for collegiate apparel is a distinct one. The CLC also offers
some arguments for marks’ effects upon cost, quality, and product function
in their own company promotional materials, stating that “colleges and
universities have some of the most loyal and passionate fans in the world.
They love to show their team spirit on their shirts, on their cars, at the game,
and in their home.”138 If fans’ desire to show their passionate spirit is indeed
“the reason the products work,” should they only be able to do so through
licensed goods?139 In a choice between relevant market definitions, the Pitt
approach, extending established functionality standards to capture retail
realities, is far more in line with confining trademarks to their intended
purpose.

134

Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711, 722 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
Tex. Tech Univ. v. Spiegelberg, 461 F. Supp. 2d 510, 527 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
136
As the court found the red-and-black color scheme to have secondary meaning, which required
probing into perception, this statement is not a result of naivety. It is an instance of willingness to
alternately invoke and ignore consumer sentiment to the end result of avoiding consumer protection. For
discussion of the wealth of branding literature acknowledging mark power and influence over product
purpose and cost, see Desai, supra note 114.
137
About CLC, COLLEGIATE LICENSING COMPANY, https://www.clc.com/About-CLC.aspx
[https://perma.cc/G3KC-NGBL] (last visited Feb. 28, 2017).
138
Id.
139
See John J. Voortman, Trademark Licensing of Names, Insignia, Characters and Designs: The
Current Status of the Boston Pro Hockey Per Se Infringement Rule, 22 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 567, 575
(1989) (arguing that making exclusive the right to sell these desirable goods creates property
“fundamentally different from traditional trademark rights”); Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68
N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 964 (1993) (suggesting four criteria for analyzing commoditized marks upon, “moral
claims, utilitarian considerations, the potential for negative goodwill flowing from unlicensed uses, and
society’s interest in free and open communication”).
135
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Damn I’m Good, Inc. v. Sakowitz, Inc.140 is another case where an
aesthetic functional feature was found to be instrumental to the goods’
purpose. “Damn I’m Good” was among several cheeky phrases printed on
gold bangles. The fact that the bracelets were not offered un-inscribed
contributed to the court finding that the phrase was the fundamental product
being sold, hence not a valid trademark.141 Thus, the purchase is driven by
the tagline, making the mark itself a commodity, instead of the underlying
bracelet. If that is the case, a sizable market may be swept up in a single
mark, adorning a variety of vessels.
One cannot expect uniformity on a relatively subjective matter. The
TTAB and judiciary cannot sidestep product and attribute appraisal when
evaluating marks. Words, symbols, and colors have meaning independent of
commercial attribution. For example, floral arrangements in black vases are
commonly used for Halloween, bereavement, or the color’s luxurious
appeal.142
D. Scale of Specificity
To normalize these discussions, what must be agreed upon is at what
scale of detail the consumer purchase decision determinations should be
analyzed. A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman143 was generous in the level of
detail granted to analysis of consumer preference. Although the company
was known by consumers at the time as the sole source of diet chocolate
fudge flavored soda in the market, this was ruled to be a generic term
describing the product.144 Beverages are not interchangeable; and even soda
flavors are not freely substituted. There were even clashes pertaining to the
distinctiveness of “chocolate” versus “fudge” as descriptors.145
However, the term “honey baked ham” was found to be an acceptable
mark.146 Calling back the genus analogy for determining genericism (where
a product lies within a category, as a species lies within a genus),147 the court
found honey prepared ham to be the category within which “honey baked”

140

514 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Id. at 1360.
142
In re Florists’ Transworld Delivery, Inc., Serial No. 77590475 (TTAB Mar. 28, 2013).
143
A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986).
144
Id. at 298.
145
Jeffrey A. Leib, In Soda Rivalry, Chocolate Is In, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 1985),
http://www.nytimes.com/1985/09/04/garden/in-soda-rivalry-chocolate-is-in.html
[https://perma.cc/
8THZ-22KH].
146
Schmidt v. Quigg, 609 F. Supp. 227, 231 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
147
Pierce, supra note 25; H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987,
989-90 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
141
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resided.148 These differences seem small, but at least have sound logical
backing. “Honey baking” could result in the same product as honey
preparing, smothering, infusing, or any of several other compound verbs, but
“diet chocolate fudge soda” invokes only a flavor, leaving no breathing room
for interpretation, and thus for competition.
Ring pops149 illustrate the complexity of genus determination, where
courts have endeavored to undertake it. According to the court, the genus
was lollipop candy.150 However, whether the relevant consumer class is
interpreted to be the children or the parents they are pressuring for the
candy,151 both can likely distinguish between the distinct types of lollipop
proffered under the trademarks Blow Pop, Tootsie Pop, Ring Pop, Push Pop,
Baby Bottle Pop, or Dum Dum. The ring shape was deemed a “search
attribute” that children were after, but not of primary importance to the
function.152 There can be many other levels of specificity available for
determining genus. For instance, the particular ring shape could have been a
defensible categorical division, as could “lollipop that functions as a toy,”
“wearable lollipop,” or “lollipop in ring shape.” These descriptions are
presented in descending level of detail, and choosing between these levels
should be guided by the considerations of relevant consumers.153 Will a Dum
Dum equally placate a child demanding candy accessories? Would any youth
be concerned with the exact jewel shape being replicated? Consumer
research heralds the effectiveness of market differentiation in creating
consumer demand, while trademark jurisprudence often naïvely ignores this
fragmentation’s consequences.154
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Schmidt, 609 F. Supp. at 229.
Topps Co. v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co., No. 96 CIV. 7302 (RWS), 1996 WL 719381, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 13, 1996).
150
See id. at 2–3.
151
The Nag Factor: Children and Unhealthy Foods, JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCHOOL OF
PUBLIC HEALTH (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.jhsph.edu/news/news-releases/2011/borzekowski-nagfactor.html [https://perma.cc/YC3T-B68V].
152
Topps Co., 1996 WL 719381.
153
As the level of investment in consumption choices are considered in the multi-factor test for
infringement, it is necessary to examine how courts define “relevant consumer” for a given product. If
children are the relevant consumers here, not only is their investment in candy likely much greater than
that of their parents, but the possibility for a mark-conferred competitive advantage is much stronger.
Shifting conceptions of consumers are discussed supra Section III. B. Of the Consumer. Here it is worth
noting that a candy is likely to be campaigned for by children, and the (presumably high) impact frivolous
attributes have on them specifically should affect the weight of competitive protections given to such
attributes as marks. See Julia Riehm McGuffey, The New Edition of New Edition: Boybands, Trademarks,
and Shifting Goodwill, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 167 (2008) (for an instance of functionalism based on
individual circumstances); see also Pierce, supra note 25.
154
See Desai, supra note 114, at 992.
149
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The breadth of genus determination can be, and has been, equated to
market definition. 155 Given that both the functionality and aesthetic
functionality doctrines discuss preventing unfair disadvantages among
competitors, logically those competitors must be identified. Similar cases,
University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, Inc.156 and Texas Tech
University v. Spiegelberg,157 still vary greatly in their standards for defining
and interpreting the competitive market, which vary across time and
jurisdictions. However, there is no identifiable trend moving toward a more
realistic assessment of actual market conditions.
IV. HOW TRADEMARK TURNED ON ITSELF
As the business and legal concepts associated with intellectual property
have grown in importance and complexity, some developments in the law
and practice of trademark appear inordinate if not outright byzantine.158 The
law is due for not a complete reset, but reform. Without some significant
change, a formalistic legal climate for branding may run roughshod over
business creativity and innovation.
A. Anti-Competitive Incentives
The trademark for the term “three-peat”159 is a useful study of how
shifting of trademark law has allowed some marks to become unmoored
from the intent of serving the market or consumers. National Basketball
Association (NBA) coach Pat Riley registered this mark160 after allegedly
overhearing a player use it aspirationally following the Lakers second-in-arow NBA Championship in 1989. Naturally, the team had no “three-peat”
championship to claim at that point, but intent to use had recently been
incorporated into law,161 and it was perfectly valid to preemptively protect
155

Anna F. Kingsbury, Market Definition in Intellectual Property Law: Should Intellectual Property
Courts Use an Antitrust Approach to Market Definition?, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 63, 68–70
(2004) (proposing the implementation of a consistent standard for market determination as in Antitrust
law).
156
566 F. Supp. 711, 722 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
157
461 F. Supp. 2d 510, 524 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
158
Some commentators fear that a formalistic legal climate preserves unnecessary, counterproductive codification of trademark law expansion. Michael Grynberg, Things Are Worse Than We
Think: Trademark Defenses in a “Formalist” Age, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897 (2009).
159
For an in-depth analysis of this particular mark, see Todd D. Kantorczyk, How to Stop the Fast
Break: An Evaluation of the “Three-Peat” Trademark and the FTC’s Role in Trademark Law
Enforcement, 2 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 195 (1995) (calling for cancellation; unfortunately, in the intervening
20 years, the mark has grown stronger, and the applicable law has expanded further).
160
Scott Ostler, Champions Entering a New Phrase as Riley Impels by Word of Mouth, L.A. TIMES
(June 6, 1989), at C1.
161
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1128 (1988).
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actual commercial sales that would follow a possible third win. The term
came into tension with the spirit of trademark law when the Lakers’ failed to
win that third championship, yet Riley maintained ownership of the term.162
“Three-peat” as a mark did not die out with the Lakers’ hopes; three-in-arow championships of all types have been won since—even within the NBA,
by the Chicago Bulls, twice. Riley is said to have collected at least $1 million
from licensing the term within the NBA alone.163 Eventually the Lakers did
get a three-peat of championship wins from 2000-2002; however, Riley
would collect the spoils while coaching the Lakers’ competitor, the Miami
Heat. Later, coming off back-to-back Heat championship victories in 2014,
Riley filed for mark extension to bed linens and cell phone cases, before
failing to cinch the achievement once again.
Beyond the fact that the mark holder Riley hedges his success by
profiting off of his team’s competitors (and thus profits from his team’s
losses), all aspects of this term’s usage fail to meet typical court standards of
non-genericism.164 The term is commonly used to indicate any three
consecutive sports championships, often by media, third parties, and publicly
by Riley himself.165 It is included in dictionaries and an abundance of Internet
search results with no mark relation. The fact that this mark still legally
stands, and protections have in fact continued to expand, can be attributed to
several recent shifts in trademark law.
The first is the Trademark Improvement Act of 1980,166 which
eradicated the Patent and Trademark Office’s authority to petition for the
cancellation of trademarks based on genericism. Effectively, this shifts the
burden of proving genericism to outside parties who are willing and able to
petition for cancellation,167 or invest the time and monetary risk of defending
an infringement suit and attempting to rebut a mark’s high presumption of
validity.168 Most problematic for private efforts to cancel a mark is the
lackluster resulting incentives, commonly known as the “tragedy of
commons.” If a term is determined to be generic, the mark holder does lose
162

Tony Kornheiser, Anybody Need a 3-Peat Slogan?, L.A. TIMES (June 18, 1989), at C15; see also
Ostler, supra note 160.
163
Doreen Hemlock, Win or Lose, Riley Makes Royalties on ‘Three-Peats,’ SUN SENTINEL (June 9,
2014), available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2014-06-09/sports/fl-heat-finals-threepeat-pat-riley20140608_1_pat-riley-royalties-three-peats [https://perma.cc/MT5F-5STT].
164
See, e.g., Remington Prods., Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Corp., 892 F.2d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
165
Kantorczyk, supra note 159.
166
FTC Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (1980).
167
See 15 U.S.C. §1064, also preserving the ability to petition on the grounds of functionality, and
somewhat mitigating the issue by providing that the FTC may petition for mark cancellation.
168
Reese Publ’g Co. v. Hampton Int’l Commc’ns, Inc., 620 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1980) (“If a mark has
been registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the defendants in an infringement
action do bear the burden of overcoming the presumption that the mark is not generic.”).
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exclusive right to control that mark’s use, and the mark is now free for
everyone to use. However, the complainant alone absorbs the costs of such
petition, or worse, the costs of defending an infringement action upon such
grounds. As a practical matter, use of the generic term at hand must be highly
or uniquely valuable to encourage such a proceeding.169
Situational matters can compound this lack of incentives.170 First, the
profitable window of opportunity surrounding, for example, any “threepeat,” is short lived. Championing the term is useless without a third big win
on the horizon, and one misses the prime celebratory rush of enthusiasm if
action is taken too late. These events also are profitable directly in relation
to their rarity. While the biggest three-peats may touch mainstream pop
culture and garner national attention, many others may have niche
commercial appeal. The majority of sports teams have only a regional
following, and few championships attract the same level of attention as the
NBA. While this should not render their three-peats irrelevant, or justify Pat
Riley extracting rents upon their celebratory knick-knacks, it is not a costeffective game for the average complainant to play. It is unreasonable that
obviously valid commercial uses by other sports champions must face
another challenge: that of an NBA legal team.
There is no clear path to how “three-peat” would be cancelled,171 so one
should consider its reality in light of the justifications for trademark rights.
Certainly no old-fashioned product source information is being relayed.
Even expanding mark purpose to include “suggestion of affiliation or
sponsorship” offers lackluster support for Riley’s ownership, considering
users are entirely different sports or direct competitors. In the latter
circumstance of in-league three-peats especially, no desirable quality is
implied by the “mark” of a coach, whose team has, by the mark’s definition,
been defeated at least thrice. Consumer sentiment is consistently invoked in

169

Infringement actions always may be defended on the basis of a mark’s genericism, or threats
economic competition severe enough to infringe antitrust law under Section 33(b)(7) of the Lanham Act.
After five consecutive years of use, marks become incontestable, eliminating related defenses such as
asserting a mark to be purely descriptive cannot be raised. Park N’ Fly Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc.
469 U.S. 189, 201 (1985). Although the Court justified its results in terms of the economic benefits of
trademarks, the Court’s Park ‘N Fly opinion has been criticized as going beyond the economic rationale
for trademark protection. See Suman Naresh, Incontestability and Rights in Descriptive Trademarks, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 953, 986–87 (1986).
170
Kantorczyk, supra note 159.
171
Though 15 U.S.C. §1064(3) allows for the petition for cancellation on grounds of genericism and
functionality, in addition to the situational factors that make this particularly unlikely in this case, it is not
clear that these grounds would lead to the mark’s cancellation in absence of some embrace of the
communicative functionality and consumer-focused reframing of the product definition discussed supra.
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the loosening of trademark standards, but consumer confusion caused by this
counterintuitive mark has not been considered when tightening standards.172
As discussed in Section II. B. Inherent Goodwill, marks are not merely
information conduits, but often contain information themselves. Thus far,
there are no preventative measures for marks providing false information
unless they are directly impersonating another person or entity as a source.
To see the issue presented, contemplate another mark filed in anticipation:
the New England Patriots registration of “19-0”173 in 2008. This was filed as
the team neared a historic, second-ever perfect season in the NFL. However,
the team ultimately fell short of this record, going 18-1. Representatives of
the Patriots have continued to exhaust extensions of the mark’s protection,
submitting proof of commercial use as recently as May 2015.174 It seems
inexplicably bizarre to imagine that the Patriots have continuously used a
football statistic in commerce, despite never actually achieving it. What
could the team possibly be selling? In the intervening 7.5 years, the Patriots
held hostage the public’s ability to sell an array of goods bearing that record,
which someday the Patriots may actually earn.175
B. Quality Standards
Quality control of marks is conceptually challenging in the modern
market. When fewer products are physical goods, the standards of a use
justifying trademark protection become harder to define. With the boom of
promotional merchandising, the question of functionality is answered
resoundingly by producers stating brand-enhancement is the goal and
consumers are expected, if not assumed, to concur.
1. Source of Quality
Which fundamental quality is under control, and who enforces that
control, are questions that the courts have approached in several cases
surrounding a particular cultural phenomenon: boybands.176 A test177 was
172

This contributes to and reflects the influence of mark holders in shaping trademark law, see infra
Section IV C.11. Circularly Setting Perceptions.
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19-0, Registration No. 77374670.
174
19-0 - Trademark Details, JUSTIA, available at https://trademarks.justia.com/773/74/19-077374670.html [https://perma.cc/YX3E-B4G7].
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Although many more games are played in NCAA Basketball—and thus 19-0 does not hold the
allure of indicating a lossless season—in this time period, this is one prominent sport where records of
19-0 have been achieved (and surpassed), by Wichita State in 2014 and the University of Kentucky in
2015. Perhaps one of these teams would have been interested in possessing mark rights to this record for
its iconic implications. The latter team’s coach, John Calipari, evidences an appreciation for trademark
registration as documented infra, note 207.
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McGuffey, supra note 153, at 191.
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Bell v. Streetwise Records, Ltd., 640 F. Supp. 575 (D. Mass. 1986).
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determined to establish ownership: identifying the marks’ “distinctive
quality” according to the relevant public, and then determining the controller
of that quality. Here, the court treated the conception of the relevant public
with realism.
The relevant market for teen heartthrobs—pre-teen and younger
teenage girls—is not primarily concerned with the physical goods of a CD
or even the quality of the music that it plays. It is instead the band associated
with the music—the band linked to the music by its image and personality—
that draws fans in:
They were individual persons that the public came to know as such. While
defendants would have us believe this is only the result of their successful
promoting, I find that it was personality, not marketing, that led to the public’s
intimacy with plaintiffs. The “magic” that sold New Edition, and which “New
Edition” has come to signify, is these five young men. 178

The notable exception is a publicly-recognized concept group, a la the
“Menudo Model.”179 It was widely publicized that “Menudo” was, and would
perpetually remain, a group of under-16-year-old Latino boys. Thus, the
controller of the group as a whole was understood to be the constant source
of Menudo-ness, not the interchangeable members themselves.
Sports teams have the parallel of a (hopefully) consistent coach, tasked
with quality: controlling a team. However, if public conception truly drives
attribution, one may find that an essential quality of a team may be affiliated
with the athletic director, school, or student body.180 As has been argued in
proceedings against the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
for profiting off athlete likeness, individuals have at least a marginally
demonstrative effect on merchandise sales and contributions to a team’s
essence. Some products, a specific player’s jersey for instance, are fairly
obvious reflections of individual value and quality contributions.181
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Id. at 582.
Supra note 176, at 191.
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Infra note 353.
181
Ari Wasserman, An ‘Epidemic’ of Fake Ohio State Jerseys: Why Buckeyes Fans Are Buying Them
and What it Means for the Program, CLEVELAND.COM (last updated Apr. 21, 2016, 4:14 PM),
http://www.cleveland.com/osu/index.ssf/2015/11/an_epidemic_of_fake_ohio_state.html
[https://perma.cc/894S-BVGX] (discussing the popularity of non-licensed jerseys replicating Ohio State
University’s jerseys and purchased due to the cost-prohibitive price point of official merchandise as well
as a desire to acquire specific player names and numbers). Interestingly enough, jerseys of specific players
were recently pulled from official offerings because of player lawsuits for non-compensation for their
likeness in these sales. This trend is, ironically, evidence to the players’ point against the NCAA, but the
result still leaves them uncompensated.
179
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2. Diminishing Expectations of Control
The judiciary’s tone on concern for trademark quality control has
consistently diminished with time.182 In common law prior to the Lanham
Act, an actual source’s indication was required for a mark to be considered
valid.183 As licensing informally appeared in the business world, the early
cases condemned those who did not exclusively use their trademarks under
strict controls, exacting uniformity.184 Usage by “related companies” was
formally introduced by the Lanham Act,185 defined in section 45: “The term
‘related company’ means any person who legitimately controls or is
controlled by the registrant or applicant for registration in respect to the
nature and quality of the goods or services in connection with which the mark
is used.”186
Legitimate or adequate, control was never explicitly defined, but
exercising it in some capacity was mandatory, as wholly-uncontrolled marks
were found invalid.187 Quality control rationalized the extension into
licensing, as the mark’s inferred quality to consumers was ensured when “the
plaintiff sufficiently policed and inspected its licensees’ operations to
guarantee the quality of the products they sold under its trademarks to the
public.”188
Standards then were also interpreted to require “actual” control.
Basically, standards in practice had to be maintained, though specifics no
longer need to be formally stated.189 Yet other courts accepted expressly
stated controls, declining to find abandonment even when those standards
were not actually enforced.190 The standard benchmark of “adequate”
controls shifted to “sufficient” and then to “minimal” controls.191 Several
cases from the mid-century onward overlooked a lack of any affirmative
control, so long as the products did not deceive192 the public. A structural
182

See Irene Calboli, The Sunset of “Quality Control” In Modern Trademark Licensing, 57 AM. U.
L. REV. 341, 351–52 (2007).
183
See, e.g., Macmahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468, 474–75 (8th Cir.
1901).
184
Broeg v. Duchaine, 67 N.E.2d 466, 468 (Mass. 1946) (stating that the license at issue was not
valid because it was not subject to any requirement that the licensee’s products conform to fixed
standards).
185
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (1964).
186
Id. § 1127.
187
See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Lincoln Laboratories, Inc., 322 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1963).
188
Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
189
Embedded Moments, Inc. v. Int’l Silver Co., 648 F. Supp. 187, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
190
Pike v. Ruby Foo’s Den, Inc., 232 F.2d 683, 685–86 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
191
Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 387 (5th Cir. 1977).
192
See Land O’Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Oconomowoc Canning Co., 330 F.2d 667, 669 (7th Cir.
1964); Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1022 (9th Cir. 1985); Taco Cabana
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impediment to enforcing quality control standards is posed by the doctrine
of licensee estoppel, preventing those who have been licensed to use a
mark—likely those with the best information on the existence of such
controls—from challenging the mark’s validity.193
C. Creation of Commercial Association
In expanding trademark rights past source attribution, courts have
accepted the “creation of a commercial association” as both something that
may not be wrongfully implied by non-mark holders, and evidence of mark
ownership by the rightful ones. Thus, this expansion may be used as a
double-edged sword in trademark law. Commercial association has been
described in terms of expenditures, advertising, timelines and breadth of use,
and distinctiveness of use. Importantly, this association-building is a
common route for privatizing non-mark attributes.
Association construction has caught the ire of trademark holders in the
circumstances of “ambush marketing.”194 This is when outsider businesses
craft unsanctioned paths to consumers, reaching them in some channel where
mark holders feel they have an exclusive claim. For instance, the National
Hockey League (NHL) attempted to enjoin Pepsi from referring to “prohockey” teams or mentioning teams’ home cities in commercials aired
during game broadcasts without entering into an official relationship with
the league.195 However, all of Pepsi’s content explained its lack of affiliation
with the NHL, which Canadian courts found effectively eliminated whatever
minimal possibility of confusion might have been created, so the action
failed.
A famed “ambush marketing” incident, which never made it to court,
centers on the 2010 Fédération Internationale de Football Association
(FIFA) World Cup.196 Bavaria Beer gave away about 120,000 bright-orange
and branded lederhosen to enraged Dutch fans at a match-up, without
sponsorship by the governing body, FIFA. Attention-grabbing use of team
colors attracted fans, and so many of them showed up in the sponsored gear
that FIFA officials took notice. FIFA officials reacted by requiring many fans
Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1991), aff’d, 505 U.S. 763, 780 (1992). Notably the
facts of all these cases included a long-standing close working relationships in which the assumption of
standards being met was reasonably solid, and, despite a lack of controls, such standards were maintained.
193
See Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Info. Sols., 650 F. 3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2011) (discussing the
doctrine though limiting it to direct licensees, not licensee affiliates).
194
See Edward Vassallo, Kristin Blemaster & Patricia Werner, An International Look at Ambush
Marketing, 95 TRADEMARK REP., 1338 (2005) (including a thorough discussion of international
treatments of ambush marketing, which is largely unaddressed in the United States judiciary as of yet).
195
Nat’l Hockey League. v. Pepsi-Cola Can. Ltd. (1992), 70 B. C. L. R. 2d 27 (Can. B.C. S.C.).
196
Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2010).
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to strip the lederhosen off before entering the stadium, leaving stands full of
Dutch spectators dressed only in their underpants. Ostensibly, the incorrect
commercial association Bavaria was forging with FIFA was under attack
here. However, the game attendees could hardly be confused as to the
singular official beer sponsor, as Budweiser was the only brew available for
sale in the stadium. Perhaps the Bavaria logo would be displayed in
broadcasts, but limiting exposure via camera operation seems an easier
remedy. By the time fans entering a stadium are being asked to disrobe,
personal expression is being quelled for misappropriation of FIFA’s
marketing power. Curious also is the unexamined commercial association at
play. Are fans choosing to attend or watch the match because of their
reverence for the controversial FIFA brand, or their own love of the sport,
team, or national pride, which happens to be embodied by the color
orange?197
It is now commonplace to hear about brands forging back-alley
“ambush marketing” associations through tangential sponsorship. Beats
headphones distributed to and worn by Olympic stars gained Beats
international attention without the cost of an official partnership.198 Athletes
and celebrities alike are given numerous free products for the potential value
of their exposure as advertisement (if not endorsement).199 If brands can take
advantage of this publicity for their own marks, how can they stop others
from doing the same? Rationalizing an exclusive right to control all possible
commercial connotations effectively freezes that event or product right
where the owner wants it, untouchable to anyone else’s interpretation or
use—including consumers.
Authorship of a commercial link is largely assumed at mark registration
without inquiry. Absent proof of commercial use has led to the “race to
register” terms, including some of the opportunistic instances previously
outlined.200 Determining to whom the mark rights should go is often solved
by the fiduciary nature of many agency relationships in business, but it is
less clear when institutions and individuals may have various stakes to a
mark.
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This falls into the concerns discussed supra Section B. Inherent Goodwill.
Andrew Hamp, How Beats By Dre Got Their Headphones On Olympians’ Ears (Despite
Violating IOC Policy), BILLBOARD, (July 31, 2012, 4:30 PM), http://www.billboard.com/biz/
articles/news/branding/1084390/how-beats-by-dre-got-their-headphones-on-olympians-ears-despite
[https://perma.cc/NSF9-C8HC].
199
Interview with Heather Lounsbury, Producer of product “placements” mentioned during the
telecast of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences Oscar Awards, in College Park, Md. (Aug.
29, 2016).
200
See, e.g., supra note 118.
198
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“Refuse to lose” is both a catchy rhyme201 and a trademarked phrase. In
a February 20, 2017 Google search, the first page of over sixteen million
results includes songs by “Brotha Lynch Hung,”202 “Dead Prez,”203 and
Jarekus Singleton,204 an anti-gang task force in Lakeland, Florida205 and one
reference to a book authored by John Calipari. Calipari personally applied
for registration of the phrase as a trademark in 1994206 after using it
motivationally as a third-year head coach for the University of Massachusetts
men’s basketball team. The school was familiar with the motto, popularized
by a shirt made by senior players about their successful 1990 men’s football
team.207 But UMass’ use was not unique, since initial mark registration was
actually sought out by the coach for women’s tennis at Duke University. 208
To understand claims of attribution, it should be acknowledged that
John Calipari is undoubtedly as savvy a marketer209 as he is a coach (and he
is a quite successful coach).210 He negotiated ESPN airtime by accepting a
midnight “madness” game and continually praised the fan base, which then
rose to meet his expectations.211 Publicity bred athletic recruiting, which bred
success that benefitted UMass as a whole. Calipari had “refuse to lose”
embroidered on the team’s warm-up outfits, which were now more and more
frequently televised. Sponsorship deals followed for “refuse to lose”
201

Pagliero, supra note 112, (a distinctive pattern could be artistic and desirable in a printed design.
The intrinsic pleasantness of a linguistic pattern, such as rhyme, has yet to be considered for its nonreputational advantages over less aesthetically appealing use of language); Hughes, supra note 14, at
1251, (linguistic advantages are potential examples of embedded psychological or cognitive functions a
mark may be capable of serving).
202
Brotha Lynch Hung, Refuse to Lose, YOUTUBE (Apr. 11, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=T91l758lJb4.
203
Dead Prez, Refuse to Lose, YOUTUBE (July 5, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=frFCbUoQcVU.
204
http://www.amazon.com/Refuse-To-Lose-Jarekus-Singleton/dp/B00ITNG4P0.
205
Refuse to Lose Make the Pledge, CITY OF LAKELAND, https://www.lakelandgov.net/
departments/lakeland-police-department/refuse-to-lose/ [https://perma.cc/5YY5-45D5].
206
REFUSE TO LOSE, Registration No. 2,048,577.
207
Former UMass Coach Seeks Trademark on Slogan, AP NEWS ARCHIVE (Jul. 18, 1996, 6:57 AM),
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1996/Former-UMass-Coach-Seeks-Trademark-on-Slogan/id321a3e72dc1c0e0e34e466699e059847 (“‘That slogan was meant for the football team and any other
program at the university. It was not meant to make one individual wealthy,’ Paul Mayberry, a co-captain
and All America on the 1990 football team, told the Globe.”) [https://perma.cc/FK6X-P2BV].
208
Calipari Refuses to Lose Any Money Over Trademarked Slogan, BOSTON GLOBE (Jul. 19, 1996),
available at http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/1996/07/19/Sponsorships-AdvertisingMarketing/CALIPARI-REFUSES-TO-LOSE-ANY-MONEY-OVER-TRADEMARKEDSLOGAN.aspx?hl=Marketing%20and%20Sponsorship&sc=0 [https://perma.cc/2W4X-2BJU].
209
MARK A. MCDONALD & GEORGE R. MILNE, CASES IN SPORTS MARKETING 296–304 (1999).
210
Seth Davis, Appreciating all that John Calipari has achieved en route to the Hall of Fame,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sep. 10, 2014), http://www.si.com/college-basketball/2015/09/10/john-caliparikentucky-wildcats-basketball-hall-fame [https://perma.cc/3CP5-ALG9].
211
Id.
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branded—as well as general—school merchandise, so both Calipari and the
university benefitted.212 It is no wonder that UMass did not protest when
Calipari took rights to the school motto with him to a short-lived NBA
coaching job in 1996, promising to allow UMass continued free usage, but
collecting all outside licensing fees for himself. The school has credited him
with “catapulting” them to “national prominence,”213 which would plainly
indicate that at least those school authorities believe a commercial attribution
to the coach is legitimate.214
Still, as with “three-peat,”215 this evolves into a coach taking credit and
compensation for a phrase popularized by his team, then continuing to
benefit later on as a direct competitor of that team. Consider the institution’s
possible claim to mark rights. While Calipari was an impactful coach at
UMass, he was also the university’s employee (and a state employee at that),
with a fiduciary duty to put the institution’s commercial interests ahead of
his own. One may assume that does not include promoting his moneymaking mark’s notoriety via university broadcasts and mandated team
apparel. “Refuse to lose” now holds licensing deals with teams and athletes
such as the Seattle Mariners216 Major League Baseball team, and Jeff
Gordon217 of NASCAR. This raises issues since both are hard to conceive as
related to an NCAA basketball coach, as well as firmly entrenched with
different meanings for relevant consumers.218 Those two other groups of fans
may all want wins—to “refuse to lose” them in fact—in each respective
sport, and the “qualities” necessary for this achievement vary greatly. If not
due to its inherently pleasing cadence and rhyme,219 or its status as a
laudatory phrase, the mark’s genericism and lack of relevant consumer
association should void the mark, if it were ever contested in court.
212

Id.
Michael Powell, Violations by John Calipari’s Teams? Don’t Look at Him, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/26/sports/ncaabasketball/coach-caliparis-wonderful-lifebegin-the-disclaimers.html [https://perma.cc/ZX3P-CW7F].
214
Id. UMass basketball’s highest nationally recognized achievement is still a Final Four appearance
in Calipari’s final coaching term. Ironically, given the NCAA’s publicity and legal trouble, surrounding
profits made off of unpaid student-athletes, that peak appearance was vacated for NCAA violations
shortly after his departure. Still, it has not altered the university’s sentimental affections.
215
See Kantorczyk, supra note 159.
216
Matthew Halverson, Crazy Freaking Castoffs, SEATTLEMET (Sept. 23, 2015, 11:39 AM),
http://www.seattlemet.com/articles/2015/9/23/crazy-freaking-castoffs-mariners-1995 [https://perma.cc/
D3FC-CQ8F].
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Sports People: Basketball; ‘Refuse to Lose’ and Pay Calipari, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 1996),
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/19/sports/sports-people-basketball-refuse-to-lose-and-paycalipari.html [https://perma.cc/9MED-RVJP].
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See supra Section III. B.
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See Hughes, supra note 14 (discussing cognitive preference for some marks inherently over
other).
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1. Circularly Setting Perceptions
While establishing commercial association presents normative issues,
so does the tangential subject of “consumer confusion” surrounding those
associations. Initially, courts punished users who created doubt in consumer
minds as to whether or not there was a trademark link on a product being
sold. At its purest form, outright deceptiveness would lead to proof that
actual consumers were misled, easily justifying this protection. However, the
definition has broadened in tandem with mark holder rights. Thoroughness
in considerations contributed to developing multifactor tests for confusion,220
a rational response to situations such as the relatedness of products found in
Aunt Jemima.221 Confusion expanded from actually misleading consumers to
include causing momentary confusion, even when overcome before a
purchase is made.222 “Likelihood” originally implied a probability of
confusion, but some have interpreted the standard more broadly, instead
imposing liability for a mere possibility of confusion.223
Semantic stretching deforms the meaning of “confusion” and
“consumers” as well. In Boston Professional Hockey Association, Inc. v.
Dallas Cap & Emblem Manufacturing, Inc.,224 the court found that, despite
consumers’ correct knowledge and impression about the origin of a product,
conjuring a mental association with another mark holder qualified as
“confusion.”225 This finding overlooked the products at hand being distantly
removed from the mark holder’s sphere of interests, distinguishing the case
from the Au-Tomotive precedent. This was a major leap in prohibiting
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See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979); Polaroid Corp. v.
Polarad Elect. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (explaining how the multiple factors considered
in determining consumer confusion are elaborated as: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the proximity of
the goods; (3) the similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) the similarity of marketing
channels used; (6) the degree of caution exercised by the typical purchaser; and (7) the defendant’s intent).
221
See supra text accompanying note 37.
222
See Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark
Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105 (2005).
223
See, e.g., Versa Prods. Co., Inc. v. Bifold Co. Ltd., 50 F.3d 189, 200 (3d Cir. 1995) (The court
found that, at least in trade dress, the lower standard of possible confusion was only appropriate as a
contribution to a multifactor analysis of a likelihood of confusion, and could not hold its own.); Merchant
& Evans, Inc., v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods., 963 F.2d 628, 637–38 (3rd Cir. 1992); Country Floors, Inc. v.
A Partnership Composed of Gepner & Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1065 (3rd Cir. 1991); Telechron, Inc. v.
Telicon Corp., 198 F.2d 903, 908–09 (3rd Cir. 1952); (“Although this usual formulation of trade dress
infringement requires a showing of a likelihood or probability of confusion, this standard has been relaxed
in some cases. Where an alleged infringer was new to an area and the plaintiff was well-established, this
court has at times replaced the ‘likelihood of confusion’ requirement with a lower ‘possibility of
confusion’ standard.”). Versa Prods. Co., 50 F.3d at 200.
224
Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.
1975).
225
Id. at 1012.
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confusion that did not, in any common sense, actually exist.226 It has
effectively conflated causing associative thought with confusion.
In many cases dealing with potentially real consumer confusion, courts
have declared that disclaimers are adequately clarifying and useful to balance
rights and freedoms of speech. However, this protection does not always
apply. The University of Georgia227 succeeded in an infringement case,
rejecting disclaimers as capable of protecting marks from third parties. The
Collegiate Licensing Company (CLC) represents Georgia, among many
universities around the country, in licensing matters. All official member
merchandise bears a mandatory hologram tag, which represents the
authenticity of licensed products.228 As a secondary mark for further
identification of official items, it also—by effect and design—demonstrates
which goods are unofficial. The business-minded state of trademark law does
not acknowledge this state of affairs. Even when confusion is nearly
impossible, consumers’ possible interest in purchasing the unofficial form is
quashed. The reality is stark when compared to the information-transmission
or consumer-interest foundations on which trademarks lie.229
There are instances of boldfaced denial or intentional obtuseness by
mark holders, in regard to consumer perceptions, as well as to their own legal
standing. These are “strike suits,”230 baseless cease-and-desist threats and
filings often intended to broaden mark holder rights by deterring legitimate
market entrees.231 Some baseless trademark-based cases are less sinister, if
only because their purpose is more challenging to parse. For example, Louis
Vuitton232 sent to a Penn Law fashion intellectual property symposium a
cease-and-desist letter, regarding a flyer that featured a twist on the Louis
Vuitton monogram pattern.233 Clearly, that flyer’s “consumers” were an
audience discussing the very law at hand, rendering perhaps the lowest
226

Criticized roundly, e.g., supra note 116.
Univ. of Ga. Athletic Ass’n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985).
228
FAQs: Consumer - How do I know that a product is licensed and approved by an institution?,
COLLEGIATE
LICENSING
COMPANY
(“CLC”),
http://www.clc.com/Resources/FAQs.aspx#
CatLink7e6f57f5-d209-4b9f-9bd0-a631b670def0 (last visited Feb. 28, 2017) (advising customers to
“look for the Officially Licensed Collegiate Product (OLCP) hologram label,” which all of the CLC’s
approximately 200 member institutions (colleges, universities, and affiliated organizations such as
athletic conferences) mandate for the sale of their products) [https://perma.cc/5Q7A-QJBC].
229
See supra Section I. A.
230
See Port, supra note 31, at 589.
231
See discussion of dynamic compounds supra Section IV.A.
232
See also Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007).
233
Michael Risch, Really, Louis Vuitton? Really?, MADISONIAN.NET (Mar. 4, 2012),
http://madisonian.net/2012/03/04/really-louis-vuitton/ [https://perma.cc/U3RZ-GNYJ ] (The cease-anddesist letter even journeys into their take on consumer confusion, accusing the IP professors of misleading
consumers to think this was legal use because they “must be experts” when in fact the only issue was
whether the flyer conveyed a true perception to the viewer (the public)).
227
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likelihood of confusion conceivable.234 In critiquing this action, the law
community raised arguments of parody, fair use, and a lack of commercial
use in promoting a free educational symposium, as well as a flyer’s clear
distinction from handbags. To quote one legal blog’s analysis, “Louis
Vuitton either has a very finely tuned sense of irony, or none at all.”235 This
was a rather brash example of a mark holder stepping confidently outside the
scope of reasonable protections its mark is afforded in order to threaten legal
action. Most troubling, with an even slightly less sophisticated (or financially
and legally armed) letter recipient, this type of trademark bullying likely
creates ever more confusion concerning which types of mark use are legally
permissible, and threatens to chill free speech.
The interpretation of “consumer” in “consumer confusion” has been
equally untenable. An “average consumer” is imagined to have widely
ranging capability and discernment.236 Controversially, confusion also
expands to include post-purchase, meaning the confusion of some third-party
onlooker, other than the consumer. It abandons the intention of facilitating a
market’s information transmission, and punishes an accurate one. Instead,
this crystallizes one mark’s meaning beyond the point-of-sale, into an entity
to be preserved in everyday life and not to be encroached upon by noncommercial activity of everyday people. The doctrine of initial interest
confusion, too, runs against the market-facilitating grain.237 These two
mutations stem from misplaced fealty to producer interests.
If the bounds of confusion are, well, confusing, the standards of proof
in applying them are as well. The definition of a relevant-consumer market
is largely unstable,238 and thus, interpreting people’s conception of a mark is
also. Consumer surveys are often cited as the most persuasive form of proof
for the court.239 However, structural limitations are often ignored, including
consideration of effects under reader-response theory, 240 observer effect, and
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Charles Colman, Louis Vuitton Sends Absurd Cease-and-Desist Letter to Penn Law, LAW OF
FASHION (Mar. 3, 2012), http://lawoffashion.com/blog/story/03/03/2012/121 [https://perma.cc/D8TWEWLN].
235
Id.
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See Austin, supra note 80; see also Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc. v. Penn-Maryland Corp., 79 F.2d
836, 839 (2d Cir. 1935)(emphasizing that “the public must be credited with a minimum capacity for
discrimination,” but also noting, that recently “ordinarily prudent consumers have also been characterized
as ‘credulous,’ ‘inexperienced,’ and ‘gullible.’”).
237
See Lemley, supra note 196, Rothman, supra note 222.
238
McGuffey, supra note 153.
239
See Robert C. Bird & Joel H. Steckel, The Role of Consumer Surveys in Trademark Infringement:
Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1013, 1017 (2012).
240
Linda M. Scott, The Bridge from Text to Mind: Adapting Reader-Response Theory to Consumer
Research, 21 J. CONSUMER RES. 461, 474 (1994)(“[R]esearchers regularly try to match respondents’
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other concepts.241 Inconsistencies in applying consumer studies to cases by
the court are more troublesome. The distinct meaning of specific words is
crucial to drawing accurate mark boundaries, yet the delicateness of
language is often eschewed. For example, one case accepted proof of
infringement from a study that asked if one term “goes along with” another.
242
In addition to that questionable phrasing, the court accepted 10%
consumer agreement with that statement as a sufficient level to find
confusion. Other cases have rejected survey findings at levels of 14% to 31%
confusion.243 It is not just the meaning of confusion or consumers or
standards of proof that are unpredictable, but all of the above.
These changes unilaterally favor the strengthening of mark protections.
Mark holder influence in shaping trademark law is strong, even beyond one’s
potential influence as the party most aligned with legal precedent. Indeed,
the way that trademarks are utilized in commerce informs consumer
expectations of what is proper and legally necessary. This is how the Boston
Hockey ruling of confusion originated.244 It does not matter that the usage
was known to be unofficial and that mark holders factually, at that time,
lacked the legal basis to impede it. These and similar mark holders behave
as if they have rights to all expressions of their trademarks in their
commercial and legal activity. The fact that this misleads consumers is then
bizarrely legitimized when courts then bar a third-party’s conduct, although
normally lawful, in order to eliminate such confusion. So, the mark holder
has created the circumstances that sow the confusion which redounds to the
mark holder’s own benefit: truly a circular path to mark holder victory
through manipulated perceptions.
2. Double Meaning of Word and Law
In determining where a trademark is classified on the spectrum of
distinctiveness,245 the denotations and connotations of each word are
important issues of fact. The difference between an inherently distinctive
suggestive mark and a descriptive mark is one of a “minimal mental leap”
interpretations to a single correct meaning or answer as articulated in a questionnaire. . . . Then we treat
the variation from the preconceived correct meaning as a form of error.”).
241
Bird, supra note 239.
242
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905 (D. Neb. 1986), aff’d, 836 F.2d 397 (8th
Cir. 1987). “Goes along with” could be interpreted to establish a relationship quite distinct from
confusion, conceivably. If a poll were conducted to measure if a brand of peanut butter, for example,
“goes along with” a brand of jelly, response rates would likely be far above the 10% threshold that was
found to be sufficient here, though obviously these two products are complimentary and quite distinct
from one another. Id.
243
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp., 694 F.2d 1150, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 1982).
244
Voortman, supra note 139.
245
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1976).
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made by consumers, which is challenging to measure objectively; one may
consider it to be the amount of imagination consumers require to connect the
mark to the product’s image or shape. The critical standard is that
establishing the mark should not unjustly interfere with competitors’ right to
accurately characterize their own wares. Further up the distinctive scale,
valid arbitrary marks rely on consumers’ ability to deal with homophones as
they add a new meaning to an existing word. However, in cases of dilution,
mark holders essentially argue that when consumers use that same mental
capacity, which allows for a secondary meaning forged by arbitrary marks,
this offends their mark’s legitimacy and value.
Dilution was first established by the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995 (“FTDA”),246 protecting famous marks from non-confusing uses that
would water down the original mark in consumers’ minds. The Supreme
Court interpreted this in 2003 to mean that a mark holder must be able to
prove that actual dilution and harm was taking place.247 Congress responded
by passing the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (“TDRA”).248 It
clarified the definition of the “famous marks,”249 lowered the standard to a
“likelihood” of dilution, and explained its two forms: tarnishment250 and
blurring.251 On remand, in light of the TDRA, the facts from the original 2003
Supreme Court case, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., were found to be
a dilution,252 though a strong dissent criticized the other justices for accepting
a “possibility” instead of true “likelihood.”253 In summary, since inception,
dilution has slid the way much of trademark law in general has: into leniency
in favor of mark holder rights.
Dilution is triggered where “in the mind of the consumer, the junior
mark will conjure an association with the senior.”254 There is no confusion,
which would be traditional infringement, but the courts have established
dilution occurs when consumers who fully understand the sources of all
respective goods are led to even think of a commonly known famous mark.
This attempt to control mark connotations, absent confusion, lacks logical
246

Pub. L. No. 104–98, § 3, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)).
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432–34 (2003).
248
Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)).
249
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2012). See Robert W. Emerson & Catherine R. Willis, “International
Franchise Trademark Registration: Legal Regimes, Costs and Consequences,” 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1 (2017) (discussing, inter alia, famous marks and international trademark registration).
250
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (2012).
251
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2012).
252
V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 390 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
1003 (2011).
253
Id. at 394 (mirroring the stretching of consumer confusion from a standard of actuality to a
standard likelihood and then to something less than that).
254
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 218 (2d Cir. 1999).
247

188

15:149 (2018)

Mutating Marks: Refusing to Lose the Trademark Trail

bounds, especially given the interconnected nature of the language that
necessarily comprises all words used for speech, writing, and trademarks.
For example, Coach, the handbag and leather-goods brand, sued an
academic tutor coaching service.255 Coach lost its case due to a failure to
submit adequate proof of the mark’s fame. While the court mentioned the
academic service had “distinct meanings and commercial impressions” that
would not necessarily have bearing, given the dilution statute. Marks
carrying separate commercial impressions could still conjure thoughts of the
senior one, and indeed, that is what the lack of confusion necessary for
dilution implies.
“Coach,” when applied to leather goods, was likely an arbitrary mark.256
While Coach, Inc. was established in 1941,257 the word pre-dated the brand
with established meanings in other contexts dating back to the 1500s.258
Academic tutors, as well as motivational sports trainers or transportation
services, all have a plainly descriptive use for the term. Many other
businesses may have reasonable suggestive uses, too. 259 For instance, a
sports bar name including the word “Coach” would be implying a sportscentric meaning, far removed from the purse company’s interests, in a way
that would otherwise be inherently distinctive. The definition of famous
marks indicates perception among the general public as a source of goods.260
However, that does not necessarily mean that is the mark’s sole or even most
prominent meaning, in every circumstance, to every consumer.
In Visa International Service Assn. v. JSL Corp.,261 the court denied a
multilingual education service’s defense that it was using the common
meanings of the word “visa,” 262 stating that the service had instead created a

255

Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600 (T.T.A.B. 2010), aff’d,
No. 2011-1129, 2012 WL 540069 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2012).
256
See supra, Section I. C. Spectrum of Distinctiveness.
257
Company
Profile,
COACH,
http://www.coach.com/company-information.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20160316143537/www.coach.com/company-information.html].
258
Coach, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=coach
[https://perma.cc/HPR2-2D4A].
259
Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 743 (2004) (“The word ‘ice’
is generic for cubes of frozen water, but was held to be a suggestive and therefore protectable mark with
respect to chewing gum. ‘Ice’ also has been used as a trademark for beer, and in one lawsuit was asserted
to be generic by one litigant, while the mark holder claimed that the relationship between ice and beer
was ‘either arbitrary, fanciful or suggestive.”).
260
Emerson & Willis, supra note 249, at 13–14 (“A mark is considered well-known or famous if it
is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of the source
of goods or services of the mark’s owner.”).
261
610 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2010).
262
Id. at 1089.
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“novel meaning” wrongfully263 competing with Visa credit cards, regardless
of “allusions to the dictionary definition.” The court addressed the senior
mark’s interaction with dictionary definition: “The Visa mark draws on
positive mental associations with travel visas, which make potentially
difficult transactions relatively simple and facilitate new opportunities and
experiences. Those are good attributes for a credit card.” Those same mental
associations and attributes are equally beneficial to a language-learning
service, regardless of credit cards that boast similar ideals. Notably, although
the court stated that Visa “draws on” these presumably inherent mental
associations, credit is not given for creating them. However, the dilution
doctrine crystallizes the word’s meaning; it may only either narrowly
describe a literal visa or describe closely related qualities exclusively for the
Visa credit card. Privatizing all the word’s connotations silences much more
expression than trademark’s justifications can support.
Granting these sweeping rights to only one class—famous marks—may
be rationalized as protecting dominant consumer interpretations, but is unfair
to other marks if we deem the public capable of comprehending multiple
meanings without issue. The more famous mark is not necessarily the
original one, creating a situation where an older and legitimately strong mark
may be attacked for “diluting” one that gains non-confusing fame, which it
had no recourse to prevent. It is similar to the impropriety addressed by the
uncommon doctrine of reverse-confusion.264 This is when a chronologically
senior mark user claims that a subsequent junior mark usage is so extensive
that it erodes the senior mark’s value, causing consumers to mistakenly
believe the more common junior mark is the original owner.265 In response
this “takeover,” the junior mark holders respond with a defense by way of
the mark’s capability for dual meanings.
An illuminating example comes from the case of Illinois High School
Association v. GTE Vantage Inc.266 The phrase “March Madness” can be
traced back to a basketball-themed volume of essays and poems by Henry
Porter, a pioneer of the sport.267 The Illinois High School Association dubbed
263

Eric Goldman, Puzzling 9th Circuit Dilution Opinion over eVisa.com—Visa v. JSL, TECH. &
MARKETING L. BLOG (Jul. 6, 2010), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/07/puzzling_9th_ci.htm
[https://perma.cc/EER5-3369] (criticizing this ruling for also interpreting the standard of “likelihood of
confusion” without any proof, and, instead, simply by the “characteristics of the marks at issue.”).
264
Anthony L. Fletcher, The Curious Doctrine of Reverse Confusion—Getting It Right in Reverse,
95 TRADEMARK REP. 1273 (2005).
265
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:10
(4th ed. 2004).
266
99 F.3d 244 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1083 (1997).
267
Nathan Fenno, Heart of Madness, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/
mar/20/sports/la-sp-march-madness-illinois-20140320 [https://perma.cc/5TGZ-GHZH] (Porter also
connected “midnight madness” to the sport, and designed fan-shaped backboards).
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its playoff basketball tournament “March Madness” in 1939 and officially
merchandised it as such in 1973.268 Nine years later, CBS anchor Brent
Musburger first identified the NCAA college basketball tournament as
“March Madness” on air.269 A decade later, CBS registered the mark in
relation to the televised NCAA tournament.270 The power of broadcasting in
appropriating the word’s meaning was acknowledged by the Seventh Circuit:
Most people know what they know about college basketball from the media. If
the media call the NCAA tournament “March Madness,” that is what the public
will call it, or know it as. IHSA argues that it is unfair to make its rights depend
on the whims of the media. Because a court could not, without violating the
free-speech clause of the First Amendment, have enjoined (or used other legal
remedies to prevent or deter) the media from calling the NCAA tournament
“March Madness,” IHSA was helpless to prevent its trademark from being
transformed into the name of another product. Its property right should not, it
argues, depend on events over which it has no control.271

The First Amendment does protect the press’ right to speak a
trademarked word or phrase, even if it does so in a transformative manner.272
When CBS used “March Madness” solely in its broadcasts, it was fine.
Marks may also be used referentially, even in purely commercial speech such
as advertisements.273 So when the CBS broadcast–use turned the tide of the
term’s meaning, it was then acceptable to advertise the CBS coverage by
using the term. The court mentioned that the IHSA chose not to police the
line where the media’s use extended beyond merely identifying the
tournament, nor did IHSA strive to convince “lexicographically influential
persons”274 of its mark’s meaning. However, there is no rationale to compel
a mark holder to attempt such activity; mark holders have no such authority
over broadcasters, so it is odd to critique a mark holder for not making
demands that the court acknowledges would be unenforceable. 275
268

March Madness History, ILLINOIS HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATION, http://www.ihsa.org/
SportsActivities/MarchMadnessExperience/MarchMadnessHistory.aspx (last accessed Sept. 15, 2015)
[https://perma.cc/9KGA-956Z]
269
Musburger was a sportswriter and broadcaster in the Chicago area in the early 1970s and
frequently covered IHSA’s “March Madness” tournament. Although he did not mention the high school
in the broadcast, he was exposed to the term in its original source. See Wes Smith, IHSA Jumping Through
Hoops to Keep “March Madness” from NCAA, CHI. TRIB., May 12, 1996, at C7.
270
Illinois High School Ass’n., 99 F.3d at 245.
271
Id. at 244.
272
L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1987).
273
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992).
274
Illinois High School Ass’n, 99 F.3d at 244.
275
See id. The court acknowledged that the likelihood of success in these endeavors was not strong
given precedent, and conceded that if the public current conception of the word formed despite them,
their legal determination would stand. Id. The IHSA was essentially scolded for not attempting assiduous
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The decisive fact is that because the public is assumed to now believe
that the mark refers to the NCAA tournament, original mark holders lack the
injunctive right to compel them to now think otherwise. Similarly, generified
terms cannot be resurrected,276 regardless of preventative conduct taken.277
The IHSA decision takes a consequential new step of assimilating dual or
multiple-use marks to these generic restrictions: “A trademark owner is not
allowed to withdraw from the public domain a name that the public is using
to denote someone else’s good or service, leaving that someone and his
customers speechless.”278 The impulse here is to limit trademark rights,
which ironically has opened the door for the NCAA to proceed with its use
and notably aggressive defense of “March Madness” as their mark.279
In another basketball case, Dream Team Collectibles, Inc. v. NBA
Properties Inc.,280 the mark “Dream Team” was first utilized on sports
trading cards, and the NBA subsequently began using the same term in
reference to a men’s Olympic basketball team. The card company sued and
alleged unauthorized use of the mark created reverse confusion, constituted
trademark infringement, unfair competition, false advertising, and dilution
persuasion through the press. Id. No legal defensive actions were overlooked however, and the court
offered none. Id. This all goes to the point of an unfair advantage that large and well-financed corporations
have in guiding trademark law: why should a court expect a high school association to have the financial
resources to engage in what may even appear to be a fruitless effort?
276
Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 957–58 (7th Cir. 1992). Even in
anti-dilution territory, once distinctive nature is gone, so is protection. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012);
see also McGraw-Edison Co. v. Walt Disney Prods., 787 F.2d 1163, 1174 (7th Cir. 1986).
277
W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 347 (7th Cir. 1985).
278
Illinois High School Ass’n, 99 F.3d at 244.
279
Enforcement stretches to “march mania” and “march mayhem” claiming both words are
synonyms for madness, tweaks including “live the madness” and “midnight radness,” as well as “The Big
Dance,” “Final Four”, “Elite Eight”, and “Sweet Sixteen” in relation to basketball or possible
endorsement. “Midnight Madness” is an egregious inclusion, if not because none of the NCAA March
tournament is held at midnight, then because the NCAA itself documents the term’s origination by
Maryland coach Lefty Driesell. See, e.g., Sandra Guy, Chicago Lawyer Tracks Down ‘March Madness’
Trademark Violators, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Mar. 21, 2015, 9:00 AM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/sports/
chicago-lawyer-tracks-down-march-madness-trademark-violators/
[https://perma.cc/A8S5-EL85];
Melissa Block, NCAA Tries to Limit Use of March Madness, NPR (Apr. 03, 2009 3:44 PM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=102726881 [https://perma.cc/TJP2-UAKA]; Tim
Bannon, The Illinois Man Who Coined ‘March Madness,’ CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 14, 2015 10:15 AM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/college/ct-flashback-march-madness-spt-0315-20150314story.html [https://perma.cc/9M2W-KFME]; Christopher Zara, Having a ‘March Madness’ Party? Be
Careful What You Call It, I.B. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2014 3:06 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/having-marchmadness-party-be-careful-what-you-call-it-1562145 [https://perma.cc/8CMT-3374]; Shaun Powell, The
Father of Midnight Madness, NCAA (Oct. 14, 2011 10:06 AM), http://www.ncaa.com/news/basketballmen/article/2011-10-01/father-midnight-madness [https://perma.cc/Q2DX-6W2Q] (“He only has one
regret when he looks in the rearview mirror. ‘I should’ve trademarked the name Midnight Madness,’ he
said. Another laugh. ‘Nowadays they have stores that conduct a Midnight Madness when they hold a sale.
I could’ve made a lot of money.’”).
280
958 F. Supp. 1401 (E.D. Mo. 1997).
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in violation the Lanham Act.281 The court rejected the NBA’s defense of a
media-created meaning, citing a press release by the defendant as evidence
of its propagation of association—using the media as a tool to take the
trademark.282 This illustrates the possibility of lopsided protection more
established mark holders can perpetuate, even as junior mark users. An
explicit paper trail is not always going to be available when a mark is coopted, and even if it were there to be discovered, many small businesses
would be unable to mount the expensive legal battle necessary against a
behemoth the size of the NBA.
D. USPTO Drops the Ball
1. Scrutiny in Granting Marks
Registered marks carry a lofty presumption of validity, yet the standards
of registration have been gradually eroded, with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (“PTO”) contributing to these woes. While its
responsibility to petition for generification has been eliminated,283 the PTO
should still scrutinize applications that lean in that direction. Instead, the
PTO, in some instances, effectively encourages bad faith applications. Damn
I’m Good284 was initially rejected as a mark because it did not serve as a
source identifier, as the words were featured in the manner of a prominently
displayed285 slogan.286 Without altering or eliminating these primary
functions, but with the simple addition of a second, conceivably sourceindicating format287 of the mark, the registration was granted. In this case, the
PTO advised registrants to add a removable tag featuring the mark. Damn
I’m Good was later invalidated in court for the same reason it was initially
rejected: not actually serving mark purpose in the customer’s mind.288 The
PTO gives credit to usages that “may be likely to create the commercial
impression of a trademark,”289 but does not appear to balance this against
uses that leave distinctly non-mark impressions. While secondary meaning

281

Id. at 1403.
Id. at 1411.
283
Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, supra note 166.
284
Damn I’m Good, Inc., v. Sakowitz, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
285
T.M.E.P. § 1202.03(a) (2007) (stating a prominently featured word may be perceived as
ornamental).
286
T.M.E.P. § 1202.03(f)(i) (2007) (stating a prominently depicted slogan may be perceived as
expressive rather than source-indicatory).
287
T.M.E.P. § 1202.03(a) (2007) (describing subtler word usage as more evocative of trademarks’
source-indicatory impression).
288
Damn I’m Good, Inc., 514 F. Supp. at 1361.
289
T.M.E.P. § 1202.03(a) (2007).
282
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is not necessary to register most marks, when a distinct primary goal other
than source identification is clear, feigning ignorance will not do either.
In the aforementioned case, the primary objective was clear to the PTO
from its own analysis of the initial application. In a broader context,
appraisals would do well to implement some minimal standards as evidence
that a would-be mark primarily functions as such before approval.290 Absence
of or inconsistency in these standards allows marks to slip through the
cracks, interfering with the operation of language in markets and beyond.
Take for example, the term “frugalista,” a finalist for New Oxford
American Dictionary’s word of the year in 2008.291 Eight days after that
announcement, the standard character mark was registered292 to a blogger
who quickly set to work petitioning the dozens293 of other bloggers, who were
using the term self-referentially, to cease. The PTO does not explain its
position on a mark’s level of distinctiveness, but, from this word’s dictionary
definition, it would appear to be plainly descriptive of the authors or topics
of all of the blogs at hand. Some rather abstract modern products, such as
blogs, may be challenging to conceptualize within traditional distinctiveness
analysis. In particular, identifying the requisite “mental leap” that
distinguishes permissible suggestive marks from generally unacceptable
descriptive marks may prove tough. But in this example the fact that the word
has a rather precise denotation precludes a fanciful classification; from that
dictionary definition, the term could be seen to plainly describe someone
knowledgeable of consumer information and financial advice, as the
registrant’s blog advertised itself.294 It was not the first blog to do so, and in
fact only launched after the term had risen to fame.
The board’s willingness to accept an applicant’s justificatory arguments
for a mark without binding the applicant to its contentions undermines the
scrutiny of trademark applications and tarnishes the board’s approval process
for marks. That mark holders can and do renege on their arguments asserting
validity once they hold the rights is a cause of unpredictability and
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Suggested infra Section V. D. Making the Calls.
Oxford Word of the Year 2008: Hypermiling, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS BLOG (Nov. 10, 2008),
http://blog.oup.com/2008/11/hypermiling/ [https://perma.cc/P3DA-M3CH] (“A person who leads a
frugal lifestyle, but stays fashionable and healthy by swapping clothes, buying second-hand, growing own
produce, etc.”).
292
FRUGALISTA, Registration No. 3532912.
293
Kimberly Palmer, “Frugalista” Debate: One Blogger Stakes Claim, U.S. NEWS, PERSONAL
FINANCE (Sept. 18, 2009 11:24 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/alpha-consumer/2009/09/
18/frugalista-debate-one-blogger-stakes-claim [https://perma.cc/9FUD-XBQT].
294
This could be addressed by remedy of estoppel proposed infra Section V. A. Eligibility – Phantom
Marks.
291
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instability.295 For example, that a mark may share a common word with many
others, such as “cola” in both Pepsi-Cola296 and Coca-Cola,297 is acceptable
given that consumers will look to the unique mark aspects for identity instead
of the common portion.298 In this vein, the word “Jesus”299 was registered to
a clothing company after an initial denial due to prior marks300 including the
word.301 The PTO accepted the applicant’s argument that the mark would be
a “satisfactory addition to the already robust field of Jesus marks already
peacefully coexisting in the clothing field.”302
That the board was swayed by this image of peaceful coexistence in a
competitive field did not tether JesusTM to maintaining that outlook. The
mark was transferred to Jesus Jeans S.R.L. by the time proof of the mark’s
commercial use was required,303 even though in the intervening time those
two words, “Jesus Jeans,” had been granted as a trademark to a different
company for the same products.304 In a brief opposing another trademark
registration, “Jesus Surfed,” the “Jesus Jeans” owner claims305 to have
successfully enjoined over sixteen other uses, including “Jesus” on clothing.
Those would-be partial uses had the distinguishing elements that the

295

See Lee B. Burgunder, Can the PTO Find Its Way with Jesus?, 19 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
63 (2015). For proposed relief, see infra Section V. A. Eligibility – Phantom Marks.
296
PEPSI-COLA, Registration No. 0824151.
297
COCA-COLA, Registration No. 1752201.
298
T.M.E.P. §1207.01(d)(iii) (2007) (“Third-party registrations may be relevant to show that the
mark or a portion of the mark is descriptive, suggestive, or so commonly used that the public will look to
other elements to distinguish the source of the goods or services.”).
299
As with other historic and widely recognized names as marks, a likelihood of confusion as to any
endorsement by the individual known as Jesus, or his right to publicity, is not a critique by the PTO.
However, in light of modern dilution law’s enjoinment of “conjured mental association” sans actual
confusion supra note 254, one could argue against this mark for dilution of “Jesus” by blurring. The
question of allowing for rightful incentives arises, because there is, of course, no complainant party
available to argue for the protection of this particular word. Supra Section IV. How Trademark Turned
on Itself, A. Anti-Competitive Incentives.
300
Taking “Jesus” alone without a more distinctive element is an abstraction that ends in circular
reasoning. The PTO misappropriated statute by accepting this basic logic: the mark does not convey
source, therefore it is not confusing, therefore it may be used to convey source. T.M.E.P. §1207(b)(iii)
(2007) (“Additions to marks may be sufficient to avoid a likelihood of confusion if the matter common
to the marks is not likely to be perceived by purchasers as distinguishing source because it is merely
descriptive or diluted.”).
301
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 75866210 (filed Dec. 7, 1999).
302
Basic Trademark S.A., Supplemental Response to Office Action, Serial No. 75866210 (Aug.13,
2004).
303
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a) (2006) (detailing a five-year window after registration).
304
JESUS JEANS, Registration No. 3379848 (following the same initial rejection and subsequent
success based on the “vast field” of similar marks, as did the first).
305
Notice of Opposition, Jesus Jeans S.R.L. v. Anton at 2–3, (T.T.A.B. Feb. 20, 2013) available at
http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=91209383&pty=OPP&eno=1.
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objecting mark holder once relied upon in arguing for its own registration;
but these claims nonetheless were all squashed.
This chaos stems from granting powerful marks without thorough
evaluation of possible consequences.306 It is also not independent of the fact
that Jesus’ desirability and flexibility as a mark is derived from cultural
goodwill.307 The consumers’ right to wear articles portraying the term is a
protectable matter of their free speech. Alternatively, if merchandising308 is
a legitimate goal for brands, could consumers also not wish to bask in
promotional products celebrating the value of cultural icons? Either of these
may conceivably constitute primary function of the mark in the eyes of
consumers – and in context both would be illegitimate to the purpose of
trademarks. Recently, the mark, “What Would Jesus Do?”309—originally was
owned for entertainment services by an aspiring Christian TV star—then it
was successfully cancelled and overtaken by celebrity producer Tyler Perry.
This is despite the phrase’s historical past310 and contemporary primary
association in the general public’s mind with trendy bracelets of the 1990s,
as well as the fact that this action is, most likely, not what Jesus would do.311
Sloganeering has blossomed in trademark law,312 yet secondary meaning is
only utilized in the affirmative of creating trademarks, even if it may count
as an overwhelmingly positive force for preserving a non-mark, expressive
status.
2. Expansion of the Mark Definition and Form
Trademarks are no longer limited to symbolic words and images.
Registrations have been attempted and granted for marks in forms evoking
any one of the senses, from sound to smell to taste.313 The Supreme Court has
said that “almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning” may be
able to serve a trademark function, when it established that a single color, if

306

Remedy proposed infra Section V. B. Eye on the Ball.
Supra Section II. B. Inherent Goodwill.
308
Grimes & Battersby, supra note 41.
309
WHAT WOULD JESUS DO?, Registration No. 3748123.
310
Instances of this phrase can be found as early as 1896. See, e.g., CHARLES MONROE SHELDON, IN
HIS STEPS (1897).
311
Phillip P. Mann, Tyler Perry Snatches ‘What Would Jesus Do’ Mark, IP LITIG. BLOG (Jul. 8,
2014),
http://www.iplitigationblog.com/2014/07/articles/blogroll/tyler-perry-snatches-what-wouldjesus-do-mark [https://perma.cc/9ME6-QRWX] (discussing previous owner’s allegations that she
approached Tyler Perry’s production company pitching this title for a reality show, which he rejected
before subsequently submitting his own application for the mark).
312
See Burgunder, supra note 85, at 80.
313
See Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson LaLonde, Cinnamon Buns, Marching Ducks and CherryScented Racecar Exhaust: Protecting Nontraditional Trademarks, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 773 (2005).
307

196

15:149 (2018)

Mutating Marks: Refusing to Lose the Trademark Trail

consistently imbued with meaning, may be a protectable mark.314 The
opinion referenced well-established source-indicators, including the shape of
a Coca-Cola bottle and the sound of the National Broadcasting Company’s
three chimes.315 That chime certainly serves a strong objective in trademark,
and is not perceived as a product feature, which many other non-traditional
qualities have been ruled to be.316
However, the broadening realm of possible marks carries with it new,
detail-oriented questions. For color marks, meaningful boundaries have been
suggested. Standardization methods such as the shade-specifying Pantone
color system317 have been offered in response to the possibility of a finite
range of colors that could be quickly depleted. De facto color functionality
has been respected, such as black318 being a practically useful color for
consumers to standardize or minimize machinery, as in one case dealing with
a boat motor.319 The evolution of color marks has been closely watched and
well-reasoned.320
Specificity in defining other non-traditional marks may pose a
challenge.321 Sound-marks are featured on the USPTO website in MP3
format with written descriptions.322 Some descriptions include words and the
particular identity of a perceived speaker,323 others state technical details
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Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (the Supreme Court held that color
alone could be registered as a trademark, provided it had acquired distinctiveness through secondary
meaning).
315
Id. at 162 (citing Registration No. 696,147 (Apr. 12, 1960) for the shape and Registration Nos.
523,616 (Apr. 4, 1950) and 916,522 (July 13, 1971) for the sounds). The Court also even referenced a
trademarked scent of plumeria blossoms on sewing thread. Id. (citing In re Clarke, 17U. S. P. Q. 2d 1238,
1240 (T.T.A.B. 1990)).
316
In re N.V. Organon, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 1639 (T.T.A.B. 2006).
317
See PANTONE, http://www.pantone.com/pages/pantone/index.aspx [https://perma.cc/BAF5GA84].
318
Black was also granted aesthetic functionality for its appropriateness for Halloween and
bereavement floral arrangements, supra note 142.
319
Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
320
See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (discussed supra notes 314–315
and accompanying text); Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent America Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206
(2d Cir. 2012) (holding that Louboutin’s lacquered red sole on footwear is indeed a protected mark, but
it only has distinctiveness when it contrasts with the color of the shoe upper); Craig Summerfield, Color
as a Trademark and the Mere Color Rule: The Circuit Split for Color Alone, 68 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 973
(1992) (analyzing case law leading toward the Qualitex ruling).
321
Amanda E. Compton, Acquiring a Flavor For Trademarks: There’s No Common Taste in the
World, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 340 (2010), available at http://scholarly.law.northwestern.edu/
njtip/vol8/iss3/1.
322
See, e.g., Trademark “Sound Mark” Examples, UNITED STATES TRADEMARK AND PATENT
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/trademark/soundmarks/trademark-sound-mark-examples.
323
Id. (76280750 Twentieth Century Fox—entertainment—”D’OH” (Homer Simpson character),
playable at http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/soundmarks/76163189.mp3 for Registration No. 3411881).
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such as “B flat clarinet,”324 and a few may be simply descriptive, for example,
“roaring lion.”325 If this level of distinction varies in description, the scope of
protections for different marks would logically follow. Does MGM hold the
rights to even a gentle lion “roar,” or the higher-pitched cry of a lion cub, or
a child imitating a lion’s roar?
Currently, there are no standard formats for submission of taste, smell,
or other non-traditional marks. The validity of any written description as it
is translated among widely varying consumer sensory capabilities is hard to
access, and thus to harness as a trademark registration and enforcement
tool.326 Nonetheless, for the sake of registrants, descriptive standardization is
a necessity, lest we expect them to seek out and independently compare their
own perception of each existing mark to their own registration.327
The issue of faithfully capturing consumer perception328 will only face
more trials in determining functionality for new pairs of sensory marks and
diverse product types.329 For instance, while courts have deemed a
medicine’s taste to be an untrademarkable functional aspect,330 the TTAB
granted a mark for scented sewing thread.331 Here is a thought experiment to
illustrate the important crossover point between the two: initially, the
primary function of candles was to provide light. Whoever first added scent
to the wax created a unique, recognizable product,332 and scented candles
might have initially been synonymous with that one innovative candle maker
as a source.333
If the first scented candle company would have desired to receive
protection for its introduction of scent to the candle, what would it have had
for options? If a robust mental link to the source is formed by this addition
of scent, should that innovation be preserved by a scent trademark? Of
course, this could have introduced profound implications to the candle
324

Id. (76575743 Infone—Concierge arrangements—B flat clarinet playable at
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/soundmarks/76575743.mp3 for Registration No. 3014502).
325
Id.
(73553567
MGM
–
Entertainment
–
Roaring
Lion
playable
at
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/soundmarks/73553567.mp3 for Registration No. 1395550).
326
Compton, supra note 321, at 354.
327
Id. at 357.
328
Supra, Section III. Primary Purpose.
329
See Jay M. Burgett, Hmm, What’s That Smell? Scent Trademarks—A United States Perspective,
64 INTA BULL. 5 (2009).
330
Supra note 316. Not all medicines have this function; even otherwise identical products will vary
in taste or lack thereof.
331
In re Celia, d/b/a Clarke’s Osewez, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238 (TTAB 1990).
332
Id. The board considered that the applicants had added scent as a feature, that it was not naturally
occurring, to be in their favor.
333
Id. The board also found in the applicant’s favor his being the sole marketer of this product
feature. Additionally, there was proof of the consumers’ understanding of the scent as source.
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industry. Perhaps that first scent mark would have influenced each candle
maker to produce only a certain scented candle, with each scent trademarked
to its producer to differentiate itself from others. However, this would have
made the trademarked scent of the candle serve a purpose, by inducing
consumers to purchase a particular candle from a particular company
because of its scent. So it seems, at least in this line of reasoning, the court
might not hinder competition with a scent trademark, by avoiding a
determination or prediction consumers would place more value on the scent
for its own sake, rather than as a mark of distinctiveness (as an indication of
source).
The benchmark of distinctiveness varies with each new attribute—
product pairing as well. Where soda flavor was held to intensely detailed
genres of generic demand,334 the specific “floral scent” of sewing thread was
found to be acceptably arbitrary.335 Some circumstantial considerations have
been developed. The World Intellectual Property Organization addresses
some of these for olfactory marks specifically:
Scents which are the natural odor of a product or are otherwise common for the
type of goods applied for are likely to be needed by other traders and are
difficult to register, e.g., the scent of “vanilla”—a normal ingredient in many
food products, would not be registrable for “confectionery”. Scents normally
applied as masking agents in products are also lacking in distinctiveness e.g.,
the scent of “pine” in relation to disinfectants and the scent of “lemon” in
relation to “dishwashing liquid”. However, the application of a scent to a
product not normally scented would have considerably more potential to be
registrable.336

Determining what is “normal” is left to the judgment of the PTO and
TTAB. At some point in time, scented candles became normal.337 Vanilla,
pine, and lemon scented candles all individually became normal as well,
even though they were not “masking” another unpleasant scent, or common
ingredients, initially. While this standard respects scents used commonly as
masking agents, it does not go as far as acknowledging potentially inherent
334

See Leib, supra note 145.
17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1239.
336
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS,
INDUSTRIAL
DESIGNS
AND
GEOGRAPHICAL
INDICATIONS
(March
30,
2007),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sct/en/sct_17/sct_17_3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TTG2-KW3J]
(the
United States is one among 73 member states).
337
Facts & Figures, NATIONAL CANDLE ASS.N, http://candles.org/facts-figures-2/ [http://perma.cc/
9886-LWJM ] (estimating the American candle industry at $2 billion yearly, before accessories)
(“Fragrance is by far the most important characteristic impacting candle purchases today, with threefourths of candle buyers saying it is ‘extremely important’ or ‘very important’ in their selection of a
candle.”).
335
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benefits other scents may carry across different products. Vanilla’s
commonality among food products does not directly explain its present role
perfuming pencils, erasers, phone cases, teddy bears, trash bags, valve oil,
drawer-liners, or pacifiers.338 It is not an established norm within these
industries to add a masking scent, and those objects are not typically valued
for their odor. However, the possibility that such disparate manufacturers all
choose vanilla has not been considered as an indication of some inherently
desirable nature it has,339 which should be protected from the limitations of
trademarking.
Non-traditional marks have also developed for buildings.340 Some
building designs have been considered distinctive enough to be granted
protection against structural mimicry,341 and courts have gone both ways on
protecting buildings’ depiction through other media.342 It is most
theoretically troubling when depictions of buildings from the public
perspective, such as a view from a street corner, are threatened. These turn
common sights into private property. A shop in New York City called “Fishs
Eddy” has been on the receiving end of two such mark defenses. In 1998, the
shop was ordered to cease and desist selling a china pattern that featured a
silhouette of the city skyline, due to the newly established trademark343 of the
Chrysler Building spire.344 The New York Times reported on the shop
338

See http://www.amazon.com/Original-Smencils-Gourmet-Scented-Pencils/dp/B0073RLMX2;
[http://perma.cc/6XLK-7LL6]; http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/home-gift-macarons-vanilla-scentederasers-set-of-6/28862205;
http://www.amazon.co.uk/Jelly-Belly-Scented-Case-iPhone-Vanilla/dp/
B005Y7QR7O [http://perma.cc/R3M8-KBA8]; http://scentdeals.com/index.php?main_page=product_
info&products_id=1871 [http://perma.cc/GN5C-TDVW]; http://www.amazon.com/Glad-OdorShieldKitchen-Drawstring-Vanilla/dp/B005GSYXL8/ref=sr_1_3?s=home-garden&ie=UTF8&qid=
1448841047&sr=1-3&keywords=vanilla+scented+trash+bags
[http://perma.cc/Y3GJ-ULLA];
http://www.zajamusic.com/oil.htm [http://perma.cc/6K9N-6C87]; http://www.amazon.com/ScentedEmbossed-The-Lavender-Home/dp/B017GB3G6U; http://www.toysrus.com/buy/cups/philips-avent-bpa
-free-soothie-pacifier-vanilla-scented-green-0-3-months-2-pk-scf190-07-17371186
[http://perma.cc/
RLA8-M9Y3].
339
See supra Section II.B. Inherent Goodwill; Hughes, supra note 14.
340
See, e.g., Keri Christ, Edifice Complex: Protecting Landmark Buildings as Intellectual Property
– A Critique of Available Protections and a Proposal, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 1041 (2002).
341
Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 541 (5th Cir. 1998) (enjoining golf course
company from re-creating an iconic hole of the Sea Pines golf course as a part of its re-creation of iconic
locations. The relevant consumers in this case would be interested in patronizing a collection of famous
courses and therefore also potentially discriminating enough to appreciate the symbolism. Presumably
these golfers would also then be aware they were, in fact, not at the mark “source,” and would not be
confused).
342
Rock and Roll Hall of Fame v. Gentile Prods., 134 F.3d 749, 755 (6th Cir. 1998) (overturning
district court ruling for the Hall of Fame as an “accessible, public, well-known landmark”).
343
Registration No. 1126888.
344
David W. Dunlap, What’s Next? A Fee for Looking?, N.Y. TIMES: DESIGN NOTEBOOK (Aug. 27,
1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/27/garden/design-notebook-what-next-a-fee-for-looking.html
[http://perma.cc/QZ68-VQ3J].
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owner’s refusal: “‘How can they say we can’t use the Chrysler Building?’
she asked. ‘We wanted to do a plate that represented New York City. Leaving
off the Chrysler Building would be like leaving off the World Trade
Center.’”345 Sixteen years later, in a new cease-and-desist letter, the New
York Port Authority demanded Fishs Eddy do just that, claiming the same
china pattern would wrongfully “evoke thoughts of the Port Authority, the
twin towers, W.T.C. and the September 11th terrorist attacks.”346 This claim
was despite the china pattern predating September 11th attacks, or
construction of the W.T.C. It also illustrates the issue of granting mark
holders such broad rights that they would assert ownership over the ability
to evoke thought on a national tragedy—a salient example of culturally
created meaning which one does not attribute to the Port Authority.347 No
motions have been filed, though they could prove interesting in addressing a
public domain for stylization of famous marks.
Freedom to depict artistically the real world was recently confronted in
University of Alabama Board of Trustees v. New Life Art, Inc.348 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that inclusion of the
trademarked Alabama uniforms was artistically relevant to portraying
famous school football moments,349 and that artist Daniel Moore’s First
Amendment right to capture that moment overrode the need to even consider
possible consumer confusion (so long as it was not explicitly misleading).350
Media harshly criticized the University of Alabama for the vigor with which
it pursued art and even seemingly minor “infringements” such as handdecorated cookies.351 Moore’s high-quality paintings were protected, even
345

Id.
David W. Dunlap, Port Agency Tells Store to Drop 9/11 Items, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 28, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/nyregion/port-authority-of-new-york-and-new-jersey-tells-storeto-drop-9-11-items-.html?_r=1 (The irony of the original quote foreshadowing a complaint from the
World Trade Center was likely not lost here, as same journalist wrote both pieces sixteen years apart).
347
As does the “Let’s Roll,” examined supra note 93. If it seems peculiar the frequency with which
serious events become the subject of these disputes, it is helpful to keep in mind the problematic incentives
that have propelled “trademark bullying” as a means to assert mark rights (see supra Section IV. A. AntiCompetitive Incentives) Mark rights claimed on issues of sensitive nature could logically less likely to
be “let go” by the other users.
348
Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Tr. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1276 (11th Cir. 2012).
349
Id. at 24–25.
350
Id. at 25.
351
Jon Solomon, University of Alabama Aggressively Defends Trademarks. How Far is Too Far?,
AL (Nov. 17, 2013 7:00 AM), http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2013/11/university_of_alabama_
aggressi.html [https://perma.cc/2F7M-QXEF]; The University of Alabama also owns the standard
character word mark, “Alabama,” even though it is a state name (see supra note 42 regarding state
insignia) it is not protected for any inherent goodwill (supra Section II. B. Inherent Goodwill) or
communicative or informational value, (supra Section III. A. Of the Mark), and is apparently distinctive
in and of itself. In fact, its athletic director, Bill Battle, leads a substantial portion of the entire collegiate
sports protectionist wave as founder of the Collegiate Licensing Company mentioned supra note 137).
346
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when sold commercially, as expressive art in a traditional format. There are
many similarly motivated, but less classically artistic, mark uses that will
find achieving protection to be more challenging.
The University of Alabama football uniforms are only marks because
they have acquired distinction and meaning via the university and fans’
support of a high-profile football team. Expansion has affected not only the
type of marks available, but also conceptions of the owners of them. Cultural
investment352 in a mark is hard to define, no matter the scale (e.g., communal,
geographical, jurisdictional) used, but universities are a helpful microcosm
where much of the community is clearly delineated and where employees,
enrollees, and alumni are all claimed as essential members in creating the
“meaning” of a school.353 While fans may be happy to see third parties pay
for the use of marks, institutions that turn on their own alumni, and even
current students, may find them asking, “whose identity is it, anyway?”
Theory grants mark ownership to the controller of the quality a mark
conveys.354 If the primary quality implied by a school’s trademark, to relevant
buyers, were student comradery, students might logically be the
“controllers” of that quality. Very little has been said about pinpointing a
conveyed quality of a mark, but if marks were recognized for inherent
meanings, the results may help align law with public conception. It is
especially curious when school marks extend past institution name and
official mascots to the likes of student-originated chants and nicknames.
Courts have ruled against third-party shirt makers emblazoning their sporty
chemises with “Rock, Chalk, Jayhawk,” thus establishing the catchphrase as
property of the University of Kansas.355 Then, a parody, “Barack, Chalk,
Jayhawk” was printed on shirts by a student group leading up to the
presidential election. Initially the school granted permission, but later
revoked it (despite the usage touching upon parody, political speech’s high
First Amendment regard, as well as non-commercial, free distribution of the
shirts).356 Student groups at the University of Texas in Austin were upset by
similarly selective permission to use school symbols, which they regarded as
an “identity and an identifier for everyone who goes to school here, on or off

352

See Section II. B. Inherent Goodwill.
Perhaps the undeniable community of stakeholders invested in a university explains the
proliferation of cases and scholarship focusing on institutions of higher learning in regards to trademarks
overstepping their bounds. See supra notes 105, 116, 134, 181, 227 & 351, and accompanying text.
354
Supra note 178.
355
Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1296 (D. Kan. 2008).
356
Obama T-shirt Concerns KU, TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL, July 22, 2008, at 1.
353
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the field[.] One person shouldn’t be able to be a Longhorn more than
another.”357
3. Expansion of the Infringement Definition
The globalization of markets has effects beyond distancing product
source. Market definitions’ initial bounds respected the regional nature of
business. However, 21st Century competition must be re-evaluated, as
gradually more brands are able to make the whole world their market.
Whereas marks previously coexisted, a completely valid mark may be
bowled over through no fault of its own, but by the gravitational pull of a
larger brand expanding.358 Who should take precedence? Should it be the first
user, the first filer, or whichever party is the more effective user of a mark?
With the introduction of dilution law, is fame now the legally dominant
factor?359 Continuing forward in this new environment, when a lack of
“assiduousness” has been held against mark holders in court, it seems the
expectations of aggressive defense expand along with the concomitant
possibilities of direct competition. This puts small mark holders in a
precarious situation. Not only do they have little defense from being
“swamped” by a more dominant mark, but they also may be obliged to police
marks stringently in ways they would not have expected, out of their region,
and out of pocket. That is a large burden that disadvantages smaller mark
holders.
Hitching the trademark wagon to consumer perception has pulled it into
the intersection of a new societal force, escalating mass media and
information technology.360 The amount of commercial content an average
U.S. consumer is exposed to daily is staggering. Large brands can use this
access as a means for rewriting consumer impressions, consequently taking
control of marks. Certainly, instances of reverse-confusion361 should be more
common and perhaps easier to prove. However, if more senior, but smaller
357

Lauren Reinlie, Longhorn Logo Policy under Review, DAILY TEXAN (UNIV. TEX.-AUSTIN) via
U-Wire, Sept. 26, 2002, http://www.dailytexanonline.com/2.8480/longhorn-logo-policyunder-review1.1261255.
358
E.g., “Dream Team” owned by IHSA. Supra note 274.
359
Wallpaper Mfrs. Ltd. v. Crown Wallcovering Corp., 680 F.2d 755, 762 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
(precedent to the contrary) (“Trademark rights are neither acquired nor lost on the basis of comparative
popularity . . . .”).
360
See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 973 (1993)
(“Trademarks are often selected for their effervescent qualities, and then injected into the stream of
communication with the pressure of a firehose by means of mass media campaigns. Where trademarks
come to carry so much communicative freight, allowing the trademark holder to restrict their use
implicates our collective interest in free and open communication.”); see also Margreth Barrett, Domain
Names, Trademarks and the First Amendment: Searching for Meaningful Boundaries, 39 CONN. L. REV.
973, 979–81 (2007).
361
See supra notes 264–265 and accompanying text.
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mark holders are able to make that case, courts may not intervene on the
older mark’s behalf, given current precedent.
V. THE COMEBACK
Rapid expansion of trademarks, and the public’s understanding of them,
reflects the modern world where brands hold very real power. Many certainly
carry a wealth of cultural information, which will not be erased any time
soon—nor should that be the goal of reform. The power of a Starbucks
trademark to sell merchandised mugs, for example, is a valorization
unintended by the foundations of trademark law, but now part of a legal and
business evolution: a transformation of what reputational advantage can
encompass. Many significant diversions from trademark intent are harmless,
even commercially and expressively beneficial, and could not have arisen
without a liberal approach to trademarks.
However, as the potential contained in marks has magnified, minimal
attention has been paid to the costs of encouraging these possibilities. Most
expansions emerged via reasonable circumstances, but left the door open to
often flawed and counter-productive applications. There is good news
though: while the fundamentals underlying trademark law cannot fully
explain the current universe of marks, they do retain the power to rein in such
contradictions.
A. Eligibility – Phantom Marks, Evidence and Estoppel
The constant tug of trademark law toward less restriction has
empowered what were previously known as “phantom marks.”362 Such marks
are defined loosely and broadly enough to assert control over more rights or
property interests than any mark holder could justifiably claim. So these
spectral intellectual properties are, in a sense, very real. Their effects are
magnified when “naked licensing”363 of the amorphous mark takes place.
Combining the two creates a mark that means almost nothing—and can
expand to stake claim over almost anything.
To illustrate, we reexamine the trademarked blue Boise State turf.364
Aside from the numerous functional advantages, the school effectively
mandates naked licensing by compelling “users” to disclaim their lack of

362

In re Int’l Flavors & Fragrances Inc., 183 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (rejecting mark for having
too many permutations to fulfill purpose of registration creating constructive notice third parties may
comprehensively search through).
363
See supra Section II. A. Changing Nature.
364
Gallagher, supra note 103.
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association to Boise State.365 The university admits there is no form of quality
control, stating, “We just say, ‘[d]on’t imply that you’re related to Boise
State, but good luck with your football program.’”366 These licensing
agreements are, in fact, intentionally bereft of trademark meaning. However,
it is difficult to hold the school blameworthy, as it may well be responding
rationally to the present landscape rewarding and even demanding assiduous
mark protectionism.
Beyond severing the link of association, Boise has overreached its
mark’s registration in these licenses. The mark registration includes an
objective of “entertainment services, namely, the presentation of
intercollegiate sporting events and sports exhibitions rendered in a stadium,
and through the media of radio and television broadcasts and the global
communications network,” and includes a description of “the color blue used
on the artificial turf in the stadium.”367 However, Boise State has licensed
turfs in red, and it claims to the public and the press the rights to any nongreen turf.368 No intercollegiate sporting events are played at several of the
high school and even elementary school fields that have been “granted a
license” by Boise.369 It is hard to imagine these schools could pose much of
a threat to Boise State’s telecasting prospects in global communications
networks, either.370
Boise State’s apparent liberty from each tenet of its mark’s registration
is troubling. The PTO limits applicants to one individual mark per
registration, and though there are justifiable expansions as marks evolve, this
one seizes an irrational scope of control. Poorly enforced limitations negate
constructive notice, foster uncertainty and legal conflict, and oppose the
public interest in free expression. Phantom marks are one of several issues
that may be curtailed by a greater incorporation of estoppel into trademark
law.371 If the mark described is a blue field, the owner has no proprietary right
to every other color in the rainbow. One would hope that the PTO’s scrutiny
would rise to the level of rejecting an application that read “any turf of any
365

Chadd Cripe, Here’s How Boise State Protects its Trademark on the Blue Turf, IDAHO
STATESMAN: BRONCO BEAT (Sept. 23, 2011, 9:35 AM, updated on Sept. 24, 2011, 5:20 PM),
http://archive.today/Z4yma. (“We have agreements that they won’t liken themselves to Boise State so
there’s no confusion.”).
366
Id.
367
Registration No. 3707623.
368
Gallagher, supra note 103.
369
Cripe, supra note 365.
370
Id.
371
15 U.S.C. §1115(b)(9) mentions equitable principles including estoppel as applying to the
affirmative defenses against an infringement suit. The doctrine has primarily been enforced against mark
holders who have acquiesced to would-be infringers, however, not been applied to cabin the mark to its
registration’s bounds.

205

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

color, anywhere.” Judicial interpretation of marks may remedy these
overreaches, but a great deal of mark activity only reaches the judiciary at
the will of the mark’s owners. Outside circumstances, such as market
positions, financial and political power, and sheer luck, may have more to do
with a mark’s legal boundaries than litigated or regulatory determinations.
Mark holders should retain the ability to petition for expansion of their
mark’s definition, but should also shoulder the burden of affirmatively
justifying those expansions before acting upon them, perhaps with some
minimal standards analogous to probable cause,372 including the claimant’s
meeting an initial threshold of documentation and attestation. When one or
both of these characteristics are present—(1) a mark’s scope now allegedly
extends to an area beyond its original, core coverage, and (2) the mark is a
junior mark—then that mark holder should be expected to introduce
evidence, both registration and usage as well as, when relevant, consumer
surveys, expert or eyewitness testimony of likely or actual consumer
confusion, and documentary support showing or refuting specific
infringement claims.373 This would discourage “strike suits” used as a tool to
carve out greater mark territory, leveraging the power of a registered mark.
Many will listen to even the emptiest of threats from a multinational
corporation, and those who wisely ignore them do not set legal precedent.
When they do, predatorily protracted litigation costs also favor the party of
greater means, especially when balanced with the possibly fleeting value to
junior users.374
As noted previously, even a basic, unlegislated, or unregulated answer
to wrongful intellectual property assertions may rest successfully in the
weeds of several hundred years of Anglo-American law: Estoppel. Assertion
of unapproved rights will garner less acquiescence out of intimidation if
uncertainty is reduced where the opportunity arises. Estoppel clarifies
boundaries and aids in slowing the creeping expansion of marks rights, and
the consequences thereof. Expectations of trademark necessity staked out by
this protectionism are too late to roll back, but this halts continual amassing
of advantage. Applicability of estoppel is not limited to the text of
registrations and could have great normative impact throughout the body of
law. In Freedom Card Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., the Third Circuit left
open this possibility, combining the statements made in a mark’s registration
372

Probable Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (noting how the standard has been
applied at the outset of tort cases).
373
Garden of Life, Inc. v. Letzer, 318 F. Supp. 2d 946, 966 (C.D. Ca. 2004) (both e-mail and website
link evidence indicating both that the defendant sought to induce consumer confusion and that there was,
indeed, actual consumer confusion).
374
Discussion of the fleeting, rare, and unpredictable time window of value, and free rider
conundrum of petitioning for genericism. Kantorczyk, supra note 159.
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with evidence that plaintiff presented of a term’s widespread popularity as
dispositive of an alleged infringer creating consumer confusion.375 This is a
rational avenue for cabining undisciplined expansionism, similar to the wellestablished patent prosecution estoppel,376 though far less developed in
trademark jurisprudence.
B. Eye on the Ball
A general lack of consideration is granted to the nature of marks
themselves, which allows registration and fame to supplant logical
robustness and commitment to consumer protection. Attempts at protecting
broad iterations of marks may actually be attempts to claim ownership of the
mark’s underlying nature, with tenuous ties to trademark law’s purpose. For
example, the National Pork Board’s (NPB’s) right to the term, “the other
white meat,”377 invokes a comparison to “the white meat” of chicken or
fish.378 The NPB objected to similar analogies by several other meat
producers. In 1997, after bringing suit against the Maine Lobster
Promotional Council, the NPB settled out of court for the firm’s use of the
slogan, “The Ultimate White Meat.”379 Cease-and-desist letters were sent to
other users, one of which was a faux-advertisement on April Fool’s Day for
canned unicorn meat dubbed “The New White Meat,”380 and the other, a
humorous bumper sticker reading, “Muskrat: The new off-white meat.”381
375

432 F.3d 463, 476 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Whether we view . . . prior representations about the
commercial viability of marks containing the word ‘freedom’ as judicial estoppel, an admission, waiver,
or simply hoisting [the mark] by its own petard . . . “); see also Atl. Nat’l Bank v. Atl. Southern Bank,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133665, 13-14 (S.D. Ga. 2010) (looking to admissions of mark limitations in
registration).
376
See T. Whitley Chandler, Prosecution History Estoppel, the Doctrine of Equivalents, and the
Scope of Patents, 13 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 465 (2001).
377
THE OTHER WHITE MEAT, Registration No. 1486548.
378
While the National Pork Board did not clarify which meat pork was being compared to, the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) can offer guidance. USDA classifies red and white meats based
on concentrations of myoglobin; ironically, they view pork as a red meat. See Fresh Pork from Farm to
Table, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/
topics/food-safety-education/get-answers/food-safety-fact-sheets/meat-preparation/fresh-pork-fromfarm-to-table/CT_Index [https://perma.cc/XA4D-9T4M] (“Pork is classified a ‘red’ meat because it
contains more myoglobin than chicken or fish.”).
379
Briefing: Another ‘White’ Meat, Pork Industry Settle, PHILLY.COM (Dec. 18, 1997),
http://articles.philly.com/1997-12-18/business/25555073_1_consumer-prices-cyber-patrol-businesssoftware-alliance (“It’s always been our position that the pork producers couldn’t hog the term ‘white
meat,’” said Susan Barber, adding her group was “as happy as pigs in mud”).
380
Nick Bilton, Unicorns. They’re Not the Other White Meat., N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 22nd, 2010 11:04
AM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/unicorns-theyre-not-the-other-white-meat/?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/69BE-JY8N].
381
The National Pork Board Beats Up on Muskrats, IRREGULAR TIMES,
http://www.irregulartimes.com/otherwhitemeat.html [https://perma.cc/5ECD-ZBG8].
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The NPB’s mark was likely initially suggestive, with the addition of
“other” distinguishing it from “white meat,” a merely descriptive phrase.382
Secondary meaning was established, and the mark is now inherently
distinctive. With this new distinctive mark came an attempt to assert control
over the phrase from which it originated. The implications of “other” are
neither equivalent to “ultimate” nor to “new.” There is no reason to believe
the distinctive mark’s meaning destroys or alters “white meat[‘s]” merely
descriptive nature or negates the right of others to access it.383 That is the
effective result of efforts when considered in aggregate.
The Maine Lobster Promotional Council raised arguments of
descriptiveness and a lack of consumer confusion, and the Maine Lobster
Promotional Council felt the subsequent settlement was a victory.384
Dilution, not legally vulnerable to those same defenses, was the argument
accepted by the TTAB in prohibiting the salmon industry from using the
slogan, “The Other Red Meat,” on grounds of blurring the NPB mark in
2010.385
Famousness controversially elevates a mark above concerns of
consumer confusion, an element that was likely not created by these
subsequent somewhat similar marks. The National Pork Council provided
convincing evidence of fame through extensive commercialization of its
mark and recognition of its mark in the public mind.386 Responses to a survey
asking “Thinking about the slogan you just heard [THE OTHER RED
MEAT], do any other advertising slogans or phrases come to mind?”387
382

As a term of classification used by government regulators see supra note 378, as well as the prima
facie implications of plainly indicating a naturally occurring color of goods, the term would likely meet
the definition of merely descriptive. T.M.E.P. §1207.01(d)(iii) (2007) (“[I]t is enough if the term
describes one significant function, attribute, or property.”).
383
See Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095,
1101 (2003) (criticizing the protection of descriptive marks as an unjustified restriction on commercial
speech, given the context of proven secondary meaning applied by the PTO—though this partial-mark
example is “white meat” being effectively, though not legally, restrained).
384
Carole Sugarman, Pork vs. Lobster: A Fight Over White, WASH. POST (Jul. 16, 1997),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/food/1997/07/16/pork-vs-lobster-a-fight-overwhite/7b026241-5bb3-4a71-acfa-504f1c8e2a35/ [https://perma.cc/W42T-M9PM ] (“[The] dictionary
definition of ‘white meat’ includes any light-colored meat, such as pork, veal and the breast of poultry.
‘That means white meat is a generic term for pork,’ he said. ‘That means that the pork producers can’t
get an exclusive right to it.’ What’s more, the lobster council’s ads were clear about who was promoting
what, Keller said. ‘There wasn’t anybody reading this stuff who would confuse a lobster with a pig.’”)
385
Nat’l. Pork Bd. v. Supreme Lobster & Seafood Co., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1479 (T.T.A.B. 2010).
For clarity, this case was about salmon, as marketed by the Supreme Lobster & Seafood Co., while the
former case, discussed see supra note 384, concerned lobster marketed by the unrelated Maine Lobster
Promotion Council. Id. (“It’s an interesting question of trademark and First Amendment law. And we
love lobsters.”).
386
Id. at 1490.
387
Id.
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supported a claim of dilution.388 In response to the survey, the salmon
applicant charged that this query improperly suggested another slogan
should come to mind, but the court deemed the survey was properly phrased
for the “precise question” the survey intended to answer.389
The possibility that the closest advertising slogan associated with “The
Other Red Meat” could be insignificant to the overall effect of the mark was
not considered. Accepting the premise that famous associations either
dominate or should dominate all other potential meanings prioritizes those
famous marks automatically. Establishing a mark’s primary purpose in the
consumer’s mind390 is necessary to both consumer-protection and
information-transmission trademark justifications. These justifications are
abandoned when investigation of the conception is left incomplete or is
distorted by a purely commercial point of view.391
Where a court deems the marks to be highly similar, its own reading of
facts could be interpreted to support the alternate conclusion if consumer
interpretation was prioritized. Colors of meat being of “precious few from
which to choose” buttresses the mutually exclusive reality in this particular
case; one product cannot be “the other white meat” and “the other red meat”
at the same time. That both parties intended to express healthy attributes
follows, despite the fact that each color implies distinctly different nutritional
properties. Thus, a mark not only conveys its own positive attributes, but
may bring to mind that from which it is distinguishing itself. The “mental
processing” of using an analogy within each category is not necessarily a
common message of marks, but it is a valuable tool of language and
communication, which is being foreclosed.392
Attempts to seize an underlying descriptor in, or to deal with blindness
to, the mark’s own nature, illustrate some pitfalls of the cognitive dissonance
between modern practice and theoretical underpinnings. The solution is to
compel more faithful representation on both sides. First, a reason is not
provided for why a mark’s behavior is not considered in aggregate by the
TTAB. An overbroad mark can push forward unnoticed—which is not in the
best interest of the interconnected trademark system. The most accurate
conception of a mark’s nature comes from a complete picture of its actions.
Second, dilution, as it violates the fundamental public interest in facilitating
consumer perception, can be countered by opposition: mark holders trying
388

Id. at 1497–98 (interpreting the fact that 35% of respondents thought of the other slogan indicates
a high degree of likely association).
389
Id. at 1490–91.
390
See supra Section III. A. Of the Mark.
391
See Brown, supra note 6.
392
See supra note 116.
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to contradict a diluter’s interests. The drawing of distinctions, the use of
communicative tools, and the right to a merely descriptive term are all being
harmed through the ungrounded “logic” of dilution. Finally, while it is
challenging to keep in mind the differences between two separate arenas of
competing business interests, consumer perception is not equivalent to
consumer commercial perceptions.
C. Out of Bounds
In Jesus Jeans, had the PTO incorporated estoppel into its argument for
there being a mark, subsequent marks mentioning Jesus would have been
allowed entry into the “robust field of Jesus marks already peacefully
coexisting.”393 However, a more realistic consideration of several such marks
might find their purposes to be non-trademark expression. Communication
is a valid function of many goods.394 Owners can and should be allowed to
construct a highly protected, famous trademark by imbuing meaning
persistently. It is hard to understand how these valid acknowledgements can
justifiably be reconciled with the almost complete doctrinal annexation of
the public domain.
Though a public domain is unacknowledged by the foundations of
trademark law, so are scent marks and many other developments. The public
domain, though, besides a cherished “remainderman” of intellectual property
rights expressly provided in patent and copyright law,395 epitomizes the idea
of the general commons, a vigorously protected public space, and the
expressive rights of all people, whether to create, to transmit, or to receive.
Defending this terrain provides a benefit for society generally. Presuming
that the TTAB reestablishes its responsibility to steward generification,396
objectively egregious marks such as “three-peat”397 will no longer “refuse to
lose.”398 Further balance will be achieved whenever the doctrinal
underpinning of protecting consumer expectations is applied more
comprehensively to capture their perceptions, even when they lack a brandenhancing tinge. This is possible in many avenues, including expecting
higher standards of consumer surveys, requiring tighter pleading and proof
for a prima facie case of dilution, and more scrutiny of a trademark’s early
dates, original meanings, and geographical scope during the initial mark
registration process.
393
394
395
396
397
398
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As established, there is no shortage of words with deeply embedded
meaning,399 occasionally with inherent and cultural goodwill and inferences
more significant than their standard dictionary definition.400 This is not to say
that all marks must be culturally bland. Consumer segmentation is no
mystery to brands heavily involved in trademark law.401 Texas Tech Univ. v.
Spiegelberg found robust meaning in a college town as cause for more
stringent trademark protection locally.402 The opposite reaction is to allow
those vested in a community to freely enjoy and nourish their connection to
a mark. Evaluated in regard to preserving competition, a place such as
Lubbock, Texas, the home of Texas Tech University, is virtually the only
place where the primary purpose of many purchases is to express identity as
a Red Raider and where the request for red and black apparel is a ubiquitous
demand. Similarly, “who dat” is free to become commercially associated
with the Saints in the majority of the country; there is little harm in respecting
the authors of its antecedent appeal deep in Louisiana. Depictions of city
skylines403 and football plays404 carry their own intrinsic appeal.
If proving acquired distinctiveness can be mandated for descriptive
marks, perhaps trademark law should apply a similar burden to potential
marks especially prone to other non-mark interpretations.405 The PTO,
through its guidance in the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure,406
draws upon common consumer interpretations; essentially, these
interpretations are cognitive functions,407 organizing marks at large. As the
public has been conditioned to infer the presence and meaning of a trademark
from a small logo on the pocket area of a shirt,408 or the absence of any
trademark or meaning thereof from the color of a vase of flowers,409 many
other psychological reactions should be preserved for their functionality.

399

See, e.g., Sections II. B. Inherent Goodwill; II. C. Idioms and Atmospherics.
See, e.g., supra notes 50-52 (discussing “who dat” in historical and colloquial cultural depths as
opposed to any formal dictionary entries).
401
See Desai, supra note 114.
402
461 F. Supp. 2d 510, 524 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (“This is so because trademark rights are territorial
in nature [quoting McCarthy, supra note 265, at § 26.27]. Therefore, the relevant territory which the court
must consider in determining distinctiveness of the scarlet and black color scheme is not national, but
local to Texas Tech. In this university town, a display of the scarlet and black color scheme on a game
day (or any other day) is almost certainly a show of support for Texas Tech.”).
403
Dunlap, supra note 344.
404
See New Life Art, 683 F.3d at 1276.
405
The T.M.E.P., supra note 24, offers guidelines for a common perception of different mark
depictions. Supra notes 285–287.
406
The T.M.E.P., supra note 24.
407
See Hughes, supra note 14.
408
Supra note 287 (T.M.E.P. acknowledging connotation of mark placement to consumer).
409
Supra note 142.
400
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Commitment to consumer perceptions would follow Vanessa Pierce’s
suggestion to integrate consideration of functionality, that is, realism, when
determining genus and, therefore, genericity.410 Likewise, the need for
considering actual consumers, as well as a precise articulation of quality
control detailed in McGuffey’s Boybands,411 would serve the doctrine well
by realigning theory in conformity with practical considerations. Heightened
scrutiny in granting marks that touch these bounds of inherent meaning is
preferable to the functional advantages simply given to marks such as the
Boise State field.
D. Making the Calls
As trademarks have bloomed and markets have fragmented, the
abundance of “reasonable” product categories has complicated the task of
analyzing mark applications. Further complications arise when attempting to
determine what is “in the mind of” more specialized consumers.412 Especially
as potential marks expand to non-traditional forms, and as mark holder
influence looms larger than ever, the standards of registration cannot relax.
To reboot the influence of consumer and informational intent upon
trademark practice, the burden of better facilitating transparent trademarks
could be in part placed on the applicants’ shoulders. A simple step in this
direction would be implementing a brief “environmental scan” of existing
usages of marks in applications for registration. While Section 13 of the
Lanham Act allows for opposition to registration by any person who believes
they would be damaged by it,413 as this article has illustrated, marks have
been tending to expand on multiple fronts, not all of which are obvious from
their registration. Putting the onus on the party receiving the property right
of a mark to explain exactly what bounds it claims, within reason, seems like
a rational allocation facilitating a functioning system.
If this sounds burdensome, it is only commensurate with the newly
granted ability to register without proof of commercial use, among many
other fading restrictions. It also carries benefits even the most propertizationright inclined registrant will recognize. Geographic boundaries to commerce
are quickly becoming obsolete. Peaceful coexistence of similar marks is
threatened, if not by others expanding into their territory, then by
assiduousness or the pressure to act assiduously out of fear for their own
sovereignty, and thus, the trademark’s validity. Dilution law aggravates
potential unrest with its lack of consumer confusion. Delta Faucets and Delta
410
411
412
413
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Airlines, both conceivably famous, strong marks, have likely addressed their
nominal overlap, but could have conceivably come to an impasse.414 If,
instead, a survey of similar marks currently being used in substantial
commerce were necessitated, then statements about the potential mark’s
distinctiveness could be proffered, as could agreements avoiding an overlap
in category or territory or committing to avoid litigation.
This type of pragmatism in applications is not limited to registered
marks. Much of the criteria typically used in determining genericism and
second meaning can be touched upon briefly to lend a small level of credence
to the mark’s viability. Perhaps frugalista415 was granted on the assumption
that it was frivolous as a relatively new portmanteau; the definition may have
been unknown to the PTO, but certainly not the registrant.
Effectively, this could compel registrants to formally acknowledge a
public domain.416 One page of Google results would have been dominated by
the unrelated publicity “Let’s Roll” was imbued with at the time of
application.417 Whether an Internet search divulges a long history of “derby
pie,”418 several enthusiastic, different user groups convey a mantra’s
significance,419 or a consumer survey answers “who dat” with “New
Orleans,”420 a mental leap to register a word or phrase as suggestive may
separate the words from their dictionary definition, where they are
synonymous with the product in the consumer’s mind. Descriptive partial
marks protection should be restored, unlike the case of “white meat.”421
As the range of marks available for registration and their commercial
applications expand, serious efforts to standardize them should go beyond
broadly worded descriptions. Why not, for example, make the Pantone
number422 mandatory for colors to be deemed susceptible to distinction?
414

See Transcript of Oral Argument, Moseley, 537 U.S. 418, 2002 WL 31643067 (hereinafter
“Moseley Oral Argument”). In trying to understand the harm against which dilution law seeks to protect,
Justice Ginsburg posed the hypothetical of Kodak entering a small market to sell monkey wrenches. Id.
In particular, Justice Ginsburg questioned the existence of injury where there was no tarnishment to the
trademark of “KODAK.” See id. Later in the argument, the example of “Delta” was used to understand
the scope of protection where there existed a Delta Airlines, Delta Faucets, and Delta Peanuts. See
generally id. at 22–23.
415
United States Patent and Trademark Office, supra note 292.
416
A similar theory has been put forth in articles such as Susan M. Richey, The Second Kind of Sin:
Making the Case for a Duty to Disclose Facts Related to Genericism and Functionality in the Trademark
Office, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 137, 195-208 (2010).
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Bleicher, supra note 93 at 1874.
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Kern’s Kitchen, 669 F. Supp. at 790 (assuming the search results outweigh the rejected
“anecdotal” offerings).
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Davidson, supra note 52.
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Bilton, supra note 380.
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Pantone, supra note 317 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Trademarks are simply not what they used to be.423 Expansion of the
trademark’s reach has transformed this basic, intellectual property concept
beyond its original, comparatively limited business purpose and effect. The
relative ease of obtaining a trademark, coupled with the often exorbitant
costs of battling an established mark holder, often deters even those with
legitimate claims of use from challenging these famous—and therefore
feared—mark holders. Given the difficulty and the small chance for success
that non-mark holders or poorer, lesser known mark holders may face, the
mutated mark holder opposing such persons is very likely able to defeat
them: channeling its commercial influence and discouraging others engaged
in innovation, expressive uses, as well as, perhaps, competition. Moreover,
the broad extension of existing marks comes at a great cost to society, not
just those whose private branding and marketing—who’s would-be uses of
an expression—are stifled. Instead, the public policy fundamentals of
consumer protection and market efficiency can be revived through critical
analysis of a mark’s depth and breadth.
Reform is in the offing. The regulatory and judicial understanding of
the marketplace must be adjusted to the contemporary business reality of
intense, disruptive, and rapid brand evolution. The answer to legal
inconsistencies and overreaching marks is not backpedaling or more
regulation, but to demand “inoculation” from a mark’s mutation: shifting the
affirmative burden of justification to the mark holder. When a mark holder
seeks broad expressive property protection, the holder demands expansive
legal rights and economic clout. The holder seeks guarantees of dominance,
and should meet a high burden to do so. With great power comes great
responsibilityTM.424
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See generally Thomas D. Drescher, The Transformation and Evolution of Trademarks—From
Signals to Symbols to Myth, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 301 (1992).
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WITH GREAT POWER COMES GREAT RESPONSIBILITY, Registration No. 85365090.
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